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Rational Decision-Making in Problem-Solving Negotiation:
Compromise, Interest-Valuation, and Cognitive Error
GARY GOODPASTER!
The problem-solving model of negotiation, sometimes also called
interest-based or integrative,1 is the predominant model in negotiation
theory and practice.' Popularized by books such as Getting to Yes, 3
problem-solving methods form the framework of the teaching and practice
of negotiation, mediation, facilitation, and consensus-building.4 However,
as many discover when they attempt to follow the prescriptions of the
model, matters are not nearly as simple as popular texts claim or imply.
"Win-win" has become a kind of mantra, expressive of an attitude that if
people just approach negotiation or conflict resolution with the right frame
of mind, more productive or beneficial results will, of necessity, follow.
But many find difficulties in applying the model, particularly in complex
negotiations or conflicts. Even after negotiators focus on interests rather
than positions, separate the person from the problem, generate options for
mutual gain, and evaluate solutions on the basis of objective principles,
many find their negotiations bogged down or slipping into a competitive
struggle for gain.
The purpose of this article is to discuss several. important aspects
of negotiation or dispute resolution, all concerning rational decision-
* Gary Goodpaster is Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. He is also a
founder of Common Ground, a complex policy dispute resolution center located at the
University, and is presently finishing a book on negotiation and negotiated dispute resolution.
1. This form of bargaining is also referred to as integrative bargaining, as the parties are
said to integrate their interests. RICHARD E. WALTON AND ROBERT B. McKERSLE, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 5 (1965). The meaning of "integrative,"
however, is less self-evident than problem-solving, and I believe that the latter better captures
the processes involved in this kind of negotiation.
2. See generally, WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 1; ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM
URY, GErTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); HOwARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); DAVID A. LAX AND JAMES K.
SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND AND JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING
THE IMPASSE (1987); SUSAN L. CARPENTER AND W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC
DISPUTES (1988).
3. FISHER & URY, supra note 2.
4. Negotiation is the central focus of this article, but most of what is said in this article
concerning negotiation is equally applicable to mediation, facilitation, and consensus-building.
Although there are, of course, differences between the four terms and practices, those
differences do not much affect the fundamental problem-solving model used in each of these
forms of practice. For that reason, I shall not, in the remainder of the article, attempt to
distinguish between negotiation, mediation, facilitation, and consensus-building.
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making, that generally go untreated in discussions of the problem-solving
model. The first of these aspects relates primarily to preparation and
planning issues regarding the kinds of trade-offs that, in situations of any
complexity, must be made to secure agreement. Specifically, such issues
include questions of the role of compromise in problem-solving
bargaining, how parties determine what their interests are in a particular
negotiation or conflict situation, and how parties should value their
interests so they can make intelligent decisions. The general issue of
trade-offs in negotiation, and questions of compromise and interest-
valuation are closely intertwined. Indeed, parties must have a clear
understanding of these issues and their interrelationship in order to
problem-solve effectively and efficiently. This applies particularly in
negotiations of any significant complexity, including multi-party, multi-
issue negotiations or consensus-building efforts.
Even assuming a party fully understands the subtleties of the
problem-solving model and thoroughly prepares for a negotiation, the
negotiation may fail because of "people" problems. These are not the
personality problems addressed by the Getting to Yes formula of separating
the people from the problem,' but cognitive difficulties of the kind that all
decision-makers have. Briefly stated, in decision-making situations,
humans use unconscious judgmental strategies which, while often
serviceable, sometimes lead to irrational choices or to critical errors of
judgment. A concern for rationality in negotiation decision-making,
consequently, requires an exploration of the cognitive difficulties involved
in bargaining.
Part I of this article offers a review of the problem-solving model
of negotiation. The aim of this section is to provide a succinct but
comprehensive statement of the model, including material not otherwise
available in a single source. Parts II and III examine how to conceptualize
compromise and trade-offs in problem-solving negotiation and address
important questions of how negotiating parties should discover what their
interests are, and how they should go about valuing them. Having
explored the conceptual side of planning and preparing for problem-solving
negotiations, Part IV provides a discussion of human cognitive processes
that impair rational decision-making in negotiation.
5. See FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 17-40.
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I. PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION
The problem-solving or interest-based negotiation model ap-
proaches negotiations quite differently than either the competitive or
simple compromise negotiation models. In essence, the problem-solving
strategy treats the coordination and conflict of interests as a joint problem
of the parties, a problem which may create opportunities for the parties'
mutual benefit. If parties approach negotiations with this attitude, their
negotiation tasks are clear. They must work together to identify their
common problems, undertake a search for alternative possible solutions,
and decide on courses of action. It is rare, however, for parties to be so
thoroughly cooperative. Even interest-based bargaining is subject to
competitive moves and efforts to claim a substantial amount of the value
that the parties may create.'
A. Problem-solving and Competitive Negotiation Compared
In competitive or distributional bargaining, parties compete or
fight over presumed fixed sums or positions to get the most for themselves
out of a deal -- "to win." In problem-solving bargaining, however, the ne-
gotiators seek ways of satisfying the interests of all parties. The aim is not
to beat the other side in a contest for gain, but to work together for the
benefit of both parties. The parties might cooperate to increase the sum or
amount of gain available to them. Where the parties join efforts to
increase the sum total of possible gains, they may end up dividing a larger
gain between themselves. Each party may gain more in a final share
allocation than competing over an assumed fixed amount. For example,
assume two companies were competing over warehouse dock loading space
which was so small that only one company could use it at a time. Rather
than continue to compete, the companies agreed to extend the loading
platform so that both could use it simultaneously. Through cooperation,
the parties increased the resources they had to share and achieved greater
gains than without the cooperation.
1. Common or Complementary Goals or Interests
Problem-solving negotiation assumes that parties often have
common or complementary interests which they can coordinate for mutual
benefit. Parties have a common interest when they share a goal and would
6. See WALTON & McKERsIE, supra note 1, at 164-169; See also LAX & SEBENIUS,
supra note 2, at 121-122.
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benefit in the same way, although not necessarily to the same degree, if
they could realize the goal. For example, two persons starting a business
partnership have a common goal of developing business.
Parties' interests are complementary when they have different but
compatible goals, and each party, in pursuing its own goal, can assist the
other in reaching its goal. For example, air express delivery companies
need persons to act as couriers to speed documents through customs fol-
lowing international flights. These companies do not wish to bear the
expense of full-time courier employees. There are, however, many
travelers who would like to fly internationally at a reduced rate. Courier
companies often employ such people to accompany documents, charging
them what amounts to a highly discounted airfare. The company buys a
regular air fare ticket for the courier, but reduces its cost by having the
courier pay some portion of the airfare. The courier gets her flight, but at
a considerably reduced cost; the air express company gets its documents
through customs, also at a reduced cost. The express company's
efficiency goal and the courier's travel goals are complementary, and they
are able to work together for their mutual benefit.
Rather than necessitating that one or both parties "give way," as
is the situation in competitive bargaining, the discovery that the parties
have common or complementary interests creates possibilities of mutually
beneficial joint action. By contrast, competitive negotiation assumes that
the parties' interests or goals are antagonistic. The two strategies thus
differ in their initial definition or perception of negotiating situations.
Problem-solving negotiators conceive bargaining situations as open and
amenable to cooperative development. Competitive negotiators look upon
bargaining situations as closed, in the sense that the amount of available
gain is fixed and subject merely to division.
2. Conflicting Goals or Interests
Problem-solving, however, does not ignore the possibility that
bargaining parties may sometimes be in conflict. Parties' goals conflict if
they cannot realize them at the same time. If you and I are working in a
library, and you want to open a window to get fresh air, but I want to
keep it closed because I'm cold and want to avoid a draft, we cannot both
have our way.7  Even in such circumstances where aims or desires
apparently conflict, it may be possible, with effort and ingenuity, for the
parties to reconcile their conflicting aims. In the library example, we
7. MARY PARKER FOLLETT, DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
MARY PARKER FOLLETT 32 (Henry C. Metcalf& L. Urwick eds., 1942).
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
might do this by opening a window in another room in the library,
assuming the air circulation is such as to bring fresh air to you without
chilling me.
Problem-solving negotiation thus recognizes that parties may have
different needs and interests, but finds that such differences or conflicts do
not necessarily require the parties to compete. Instead, such conflicts are
often useful in crafting an agreement. Even where the parties have
conflicting interests, they may nonetheless creatively devise ways to serve
their respective interests, as in the loading dock and library examples. If
successful, the parties may obtain results benefiting both more completely
than if they had been competing to win or engaging in simple compromise.
3. Compromise in Problem-solving Negotiation
Unlike simple compromise bargaining, problem-solving bargain-
ing does not focus on compromising for the sake of agreement. Instead,
parties work toward agreement by means other than compromise,
searching for agreements that best serve their respective interests. The
operative premise against easy compromise facilitates "constructive
conflict." Where the parties resist easy solutions - and simple compromise
is an easy solution - they are forced to be inventive or creative, to
undertake a wide-ranging search for ways to benefit both parties. That
creativity can lead to greater gains for each party than can simple com-
promise, which, at best, merely mitigates losses. Surprisingly often, when
negotiating parties search beyond simple compromise, they discover ways
to integrate their interests so that both gain. If they work at it, parties can
often find creative solutions which will make them better off than a simple
compromise.
Even with the best intentions and cooperative efforts, however,
the parties will sometimes find that their interests apparently conflict, such
that they cannot find a means to completely satisfy all their interests.
Their interests may so conflict that the only solution to the conflict is
compromise.
There are, however, different ways to compromise. In par-
ticular, trade-off compromising may present greater possible gains to the
parties than simple division compromising. Redefining a bargaining
situation to include a greater number of interests and issues creates trade-
off possibilities, making greater overall gains available to the parties.
Thus, in those cases where parties cannot create new gain - in the sense of
creating new resources - they can nonetheless work together to expand
their bargaining. In doing so, they may find a possible gain already
available in the situation, one they had not initially perceived to be there,
and distribute it for maximum benefit. Compromise is a solution to
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
conflict, but some kinds of compromise are better than others. More
specifically, trade-off compromising may leave each party better off than
simple division compromising.
The problem-solving model of negotiation, therefore, does
recognize compromise as a useful and creative tool to reach agreement.
Nevertheless, as too easy a resort to compromise may inhibit other, more
creative and more gain-producing solutions to conflict, the problem-solving
model looks to compromise as a last, rather than a first, resort in
attempting to fashion agreements.
B. Basic Problem-solving Negotiation
Problem-solving negotiation follows the same process involved in
any sort of problem-solving. There is first a definition of the problem, a
search for solutions to it, and then an evaluation of alternative solutions
against some set of criteria. However, the process is dynamic, and all
stages are subject to refinement based on developing information and
reassessments. Thus, as a person reflects on possible solutions to a
problem, she may also begin to redefine the problem, and any redefinition
will lead to new possible solutions. Similarly, as she evaluates solutions
and focuses on the most promising ones, she may discover that her criteria
for evaluation are inappropriate, causing her to develop new criteria. New
evaluative criteria might also lead to new ways of looking at the problem
and a new problem definition, or to a renewed search for possible
solutions to the problem.
Individual problem-solving is a dynamic learning process which
can be complex. Problem-solving negotiation, while following the same
process, adds potential complexity by adding parties who must work
together to solve problems they share. The parties may differ in their
initial definitions of the problem, in their proposed possible solutions, and
in the criteria they use to evaluate possible solutions, particularly in
identifying their respective best alternatives to a negotiated settlement!
Not only is each party proposing its own views, interests, preferences, and
values, it is also learning about the other's. Indeed, in complex problem-
solving negotiation, negotiators constantly reassess their interests and
preferences as they gain information; and their perceptions of problems,
possible solutions and agreements, and even their sense of alternatives to
agreement change. In short, they revalue their situations. Thus, problem-
solving negotiation, while often complicated and difficult to manage, is a
process open to novel and mutually beneficial solutions to joint problems.
8. Usually called the BATNA - Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.
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Diagrammed, the process looks like this:9
Problem-solving process in negotiation,
mediation, Ad consensus-building
9. For a similar, but simpler diagram, see WALTON & McKERSIE, supra note 1, at 138.
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This model of negotiation is, of course, rather idealistic, for it
operates on the premise that the negotiating parties cooperate fully and do
not seek to take advantage of one another. For example, the model calls
on the parties to share information fully, to define problems mutually, and
to work as allies to find solutions to their problems. One might agree that
this would be a good process to resolve differences, but doubt that parties
could or would act in such a trusting, possibly altruistic, manner. Thus
the model seems naive.
However, the problem-solving model can incorporate conflict and
recognize that parties, in their self-interest, may attempt to skew or
manipulate these supposed open and mutual processes in their favor. Even
where parties cooperate or collaborate to increase gains, they must still
divide any value they jointly create; opportunities remain for competitive
self-seeking. The problem-solving model can take such possibilities into
account and find ways of dealing with them. However, one must first
develop an understanding of how problem-solving bargaining works. This
more general issue of competition within problem-solving negotiation will
be discussed, following an exploration of the basic features of the model,
sketched by elements and process stages.
C. Initiating Problem-solving Negotiation
The problem-solving strategy contemplates that each side in a
negotiation will seek to satisfy its own interests and that each side should
collaborate with the other parties to define and solve the problems between
them. For the problem-solving strategy to work, the negotiators must
establish problem-solving ground rules, either implicitly or explicitly.
This ensures that each party is engaged in, and is hopefully equally
committed to, the same activity.
If the parties do not agree that they will bargain in a problem-
solving manner, at least one of them must propose or initiate the strategy.
Thus, in dealing with relatively unknown parties or parties who are in-
clined to negotiate competitively, one who wishes to problem-solve may
need to begin the negotiation by negotiating the actual negotiation
procedure. Negotiators do this expressly by openly making the negotiating
process itself an initial subject of negotiation. Alternatively, a negotiator
could simply use the problem-solving strategy, for example, to probe for
full information, to discover the other side's interests, to reveal the
negotiator's own interests, etc. This can be done quite naturally, and it is
often possible to shift bargaining away from a competitive and positional
focus to a more productive problem-solving focus.
Depending on how competitive the other side appears to be, the
problem-solving negotiator may need to be very insistent on the way she
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
wants to bargain. She can do this either by seeking the other side's
commitment to problem-solving bargaining or by using tactics which move
the other side into a reciprocal problem-solving stance. During
negotiation, the problem-solving negotiator simply refuses to accept
positions as a basis for bargaining. Instead, she asks hard questions about
what interests justify the positions the other side takes. She works to
create a free flow of information and insists on clear and -accurate
communication where the parties state their needs concretely. If it is safe
to do so, she is explicit about her side's needs, values, and objectives. She
seeks to discover the other party's as well, making a genuine attempt to
understand the other side and how it perceives its interests and the sit-
uation.
1. Exploration of Interests and Differences
Two general strategies may increase the possible gain available to
the parties or to "create value:" to find common and complementary in-
terests and to exploit differences. Where parties share interests, they may
be able to devise some agreement which satisfies such interests or find
some way in which their different interests can mesh. Where their in-
terests conflict, and there are also differences between the parties in goals,
values, stakes, outlooks, predictions, risk-aversion, and time-preferences,
it may be possible to exploit those differences in ways that satisfy all of
the parties' perceptions of the situation.
Joint gains come from exploiting differences, and it is the parties'
differential perception and assessment of situations that leads to trade-
offs.1" For example, suppose we are negotiating a contract under which
I will supply you, for a relatively long term, a rather unique article I
manufacture. I depend on a foreign supplier for materials to make the
product. As I am concerned about my supply and fear my supply costs
may go up, I want to charge you the highest price I can. You, on the
other hand, think foreign supplies are, and will continue to be stable, and,
therefore, the price should be lower. Rather than compromise on a
specific price for the life of the contract, we could agree to let the price
depend on some formula that took into account the cost of the foreign sup-
ply. In other words, our predictions about the available foreign supply
differ. If we are each willing to act on our own predictions, we can use
this difference to craft an agreement satisfactory to each of us.
Because these kinds of differences between parties, if somehow
reflected in a final agreement, allow each party to get what it wants, or
10. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 92-106.
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thinks it needs, it is essential for the parties to discover and thoroughly
explore such differences. The parties need to examine their respective in-
terests, values, goals, and perceptions of the situation carefully, as well as
attempt to discover their differential beliefs, forecasts or predictions, risk
attitudes, and time preferences."1 This examination will open up possi-
bilities for exploiting differences by matching what one party finds valu-
able or desirable to gain with what another party finds relatively costless
to forfeit. For this process to work, of course, the parties must also
depersonalize conflict by accepting differences in viewpoints, rather than
seeking to impose their respective viewpoints on one another.
2. Problem Definition
Once there is full exploration of interests and viewpoints, the
particular negotiating problems the parties have should be fairly apparent.
In general, they will take the form, "How do we work together to satisfy
those interests we have articulated in our discussion?" Significantly, the
parties* may not in fact agree in their views of what the common problem
is, and this may take some negotiating. This disagreement means that the
parties have not communicated well; they really have not understood one
another's points of view. Consequently, problem-definition is an
opportunity for the parties to determine whether they really understand one
another, and they should take it seriously.
D. Problem-solving and Value Creation
Once the parties agree on the issues between them, the negotiation
can turn to problem-solving, an actual search for solutions. However, as
each party is seeking to maximize its own interests, as implicated in the
negotiation, it is most useful to pose options which each thinks may
advance the interests of all. The parties may use any process they wish to
help devise alternative solutions or options. Brainstorming is a
particularly useful process because the rules of brainstorming reduce
inhibitions in idea-generation and preclude discussion of ideas as they
occur. 12
11. Id. at 91, 99-102.
12. Those who propose an idea often take a proprietary interest in it, and their desire to
see it accepted diverts the process from idea generation which is the essential task at this
point in a problem-solving negotiation.
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1. Specific Ways of Working Toward Integrative Agreements
Negotiators can consciously focus on four general ways to work
toward integrative agreements to help generate a list of options.' First,
the parties can attempt to increase resources so that they parties no longer
compete for them. Second, the parties can also look for bridging
solutions. "Bridging" involves finding some way of advancing both
parties' interests simultaneously. The air courier example discussed above
is an instance of a bridging solution.14 Third, an agreement option
imposes costs which might cause a party to resist it. However, it may be
possible to cut or minimize the costs, or compensate the other side via side
payments. Finally, the parties can pose and explore options which involve
trade-offs, log-rolling, and packaging, as discussed below.'
2. Separating Solution-generation From Evaluation
The aim of problem-solving negotiation is to find the best
solutions to the general problem of coordinating and reconciling the
parties' interests. It is most useful for the parties to separate the processes
of developing options from that of deciding which option is the best
solution. Evaluating ideas as they arise tends to stifle idea development,
precludes cross-fertilization between ideas, and cuts off packaging oppor-
tunities. When ideas are evaluated as they arise, there is a risk that the
parties will argue about them rather than treat them as tentative and
exploratory proposals. In addition, there is always the possibility that a
party will advance only those ideas most likely to benefit it the most.
Separating the process of evaluation from that of idea-generation somewhat
weakens the force of this kind of calculated behavior.
13. See DEAN PRUITr & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLIcT: ESCALATION,
STALEMATE, AND SEFrILFmENT 143-148 (1986).
14. Another simple example of bridging, sometimes used as a simulated negotiation
problem, involves two parties negotiating over a small shipment of rare oranges. One party
wants the oranges for the pulp; the other for the skin, which is to be used to extract a rare,
naturally occurring, medicinally useful chemical. If each party enters the negotiation posi-
tional and simply demands that it have the oranges, it's obvious that ,they will be in serious
conflict. If they reveal to each other why they want the oranges, and exactly what their
interest in them is, however, they will discover they have no conflict at all, but that their
interests are complementary. This problem, called the Ugli Orange Exercise, can be found in
A MANUAL FOR GROUP FACILITATORS, App. C, 81 (Center for Conflict Resolution, 1977).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 40-54.
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3. Evaluation: Narrowing of Options and Value Claiming
Once the parties have a list of alternative ideas or options for
solving the problem, they must evaluate these options and decide the terms
of their agreement. A party should consider how well any particular
option serves its interests, rejecting options which do not advance those
interests or require undesirable compromise. In considering options, a
party should compare the outcome any option produces with the best
alternatives to a negotiated settlement. Obviously, if a proposed negotiated
outcome is not better than other alternatives, a party should not agree to it.
4. An Example of a Problem-solving Negotiation
Assume there is a large manufacturing company which is expe-
riencing high production costs at several of its older plants. It has exam-
ined its costs carefully and has concluded that these plants are
technologically inefficient, and that the company would be better off to
close these plants and build new ones, taking advantage of robotics
manufacturing processes. If the company closes the plants, however,
many employees will lose their jobs. The union, therefore, makes plant
closures an issue in the next round of bargaining with the company. 6
In these circumstances, each party could hard-bargain: the
company going forward despite union objections, and the union striking if
the company goes forward. The parties' alternatives to a negotiated set-
tlement are not good. The company could close plants and suffer a strike.
The union could accept plant closures with attendant job losses or it could
strike. The strike script, however, would convert the situation into a
contest of strength and economics which would undoubtedly be very costly
to both sides.
Reducing the situation to just a few interests, the company has
important interests in profitability, efficiency, and a stable, experienced,
and cooperative workforce. The union has the important interests of
protecting workers' jobs, but that interest must take into account the
continued competitiveness and vitality of the company. Assuming that the
union accepts the company's factual claims about the inefficiency and
noncompetitiveness of its older plants, the parties could define their joint
problem as how to increase productivity in the inefficient plants without
unduly threatening worker job security. As alternative solutions, they
might propose more rigorous production standards, restrictions on new
16. The example is based on a case discussed in WALTON & McKERsIE, supra note 1,
at 160.
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hiring following retirements, selective layoffs, and possibly even wage
reductions.
However, when the company evaluates these proposals, it decides
that they will not solve the productivity problem, which it deems due to
plant design, location, and equipment. Assume that the company's studies
convince the union that the company's conclusion is correct. The parties
might then define the problem as how to close the plants with least harm
to the workers. As possible solutions to this problem, they might pose
training and job relocation programs; synchronizing old plant closures with
new plant openings so that workers can transfer; and establishing a special
worker assistance fund. Both the company and union might find these
possible solutions, or some combination of them, better than their no-
agreement alternatives and might likely agree to them.
5. Evaluation Problems: Value Claiming in
Problem-solving Negotiation
In problem-solving negotiation, there are two different kinds of
bargaining activities going on: value creation,17 that is, devising
"increasing sum" solutions to the parties' common problems; and value
claiming,'" that is, dividing up any gain the parties create. In other
words, the parties collaborate to increase the possible available gain and
they find some way to distribute the gain between them. How they
distribute gain may be a significant problem, for while there may be more
to share, the parties may also opportunistically seek to appropriate for
themselves as much of that gain as possible.
This is easy to illustrate. Suppose Delta (A) and Sigma (E) have
just been involved in a problem-solving or integrative bargaining session
and they have come up with five different options or ways to create value,
but that each of these ways of adding value also differently allocates the
value gain as between the parties. Graphed, their situation looks like this:
b
Payoff to Z a c
e
d
Payoff to A
17. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 30.
18. Id. at 32.
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In this payoff schedule, solution b confers the most gain on E and
solution e the most gain on A. Solution c, roughly and in terms of relative
share, is equally good to both parties. It is not, however, the maximum
gain either party could get. The parties will likely perceive this.
Therefore, there is an increased likelihood that each party will promote or
argue for the particular solution which favors it most. In the example, E
will argue for b and A for e.
This example clarifies the distributive problem in integrative
bargaining. Although the parties may create value, they must still divide
it. Often, they will divide it by agreeing to accept some particular solution
as a way of satisfying their interests, but some solutions may be relatively
better for one side than for the other. In dividing up the gain, or deciding
which particular solution to agree to, the parties can use any of the basic
bargaining strategies: they could bargain competitively, compromise bar-
gain, or problem-solve. 9 Of these, competitive bargaining is of most
concern, for it may not be readily apparent that it is occurring. An
innocent negotiator may fail to realize that the other side is appropriating
the greatest part, or at least a disproportionate share, of the joint gain."
In the simplest case the parties would bargain integratively to
increase the amount of available gain, and then bargain openly and allocate
the gain between them. But negotiations do not usually divide into such
neat and distinct phases. Indeed, it is difficult during the course of a
negotiation for negotiators to shift from integrative to distributive
bargaining because the two strategies are generally inconsistent with one
another."' For example, genuine integrative bargaining requires full
information disclosure and a joint search for solutions to a common
problem. Distributive bargaining, in contrast, requires, at best, selective
information disclosure and information manipulation to insure intended
effects, and seeks to control proposed solutions to insure maximal gain.
Thus, in cases where the parties initially bargained integratively to
19. The idealistic, and rather simplistic, problem-solving model promoted by some
proposes, in effect, that the parties seek to divide gain fairly by agreeing to use some
mutually selected, objective principle, e.g., fair market value. In essence, this appears to be
an effort to extend the problem-solving model one step further - not only to create gain, but
to search for some mutually acceptable fair way to divide the gain created. See FISHER &
URY, supra note 2, at 84-86.
20. As basic bargaining strategies, problem-solving and hard-bargaining are inconsistent
with one another. For example, where the problem-solving strategy calls for full information
disclosure, hard-bargaining contemplates withholding information. It is nonetheless possible
for a bargainer both to attempt to increase available gain and to appropriate most of that gain.
In doing so, however, the bargainer would, to a certain degree, have to cooperate in
problem-solving and also non-transparently use some hard bargaining techniques and tactics.
21. See generally WALTON & McKERsIE, supra note 1, at 161-183.
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increase gain, they will have disclosed the very information they should
have concealed in order to maximize their gain from the negotiation. For
example, suppose I want to sell you an item that my company has
overproduced, given the market for the product. If I disclose the
overproduction to you, I cannot later, in order to get from you as high a
price as possible, pretend I will have no difficulty in selling it to someone
else.
E. Mixed Bargaining
Because of the inconsistency of disclosure requirements with the
general approach, phase shifts from integrative to distributive bargaining
are difficult to manage. As a result, parties may attempt a simultaneous
complex blending of integrative and distributive moves. For example, in
order to take advantage of the other side's willingness to engage in
integrative bargaining, the hard-bargainer, while pretending to give full in-
formation, could instead selectively withhold information. Similarly,
rather than engage in a genuine search for creative alternatives to solve the
joint problem, the hard bargainer might offer and advance only those
solutions which would, if accepted, confer the most gain on his side. The
hard-bargainer could also dissemble about his preferences or priorities or
distort the actual amount of gains or losses certain alternatives might
confer or impose on him. Alternatively, a negotiator could selectively
bargain integratively in good faith on some issues while merely pretending
to do so on other issues. This might allow him to make clever and
advantageous trade-offs later on.
In such cases, the negotiator follows a complex "mixed bar-
gaining" strategy involving apparent integrative bargaining moves which
screen actual distributive aims.' The result is what might be called
"variable sum" bargaining, as distinguished from "zero-sum" and
"positive-sum" bargaining. In variable sum bargaining, the gains realized
in the negotiation depend on the actual amount of genuine integrative
bargaining taking place.' Where a party manipulates integrative
bargaining in order to secure a greater share allocation of any gains, there
may be less overall gain than there would have been if both parties had
genuinely engaged in integrative bargaining.
The concern here, however, is not so much the bargaining effi-
ciency, that is, whether the parties have failed to realize all potential gains,
but rather exploitation of one party by the other. Negotiators engaged in
22. See WALTON & McKERsIE, supra note 1, at 161-169.
23. See id. at 163-164.
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problem-solving negotiation should be alert to this possibility. Unless
justifiably trusting of the other side, they should adopt an overall strategy
of working to increase gain and acting defensively to prevent the other
side from getting a disproportionate share of it.'
One way to limit competitive claiming is to insist on principled
evaluation of the options the parties are considering incorporating into
their agreement. For example, suppose a negotiation involves a factual
dispute, or a dispute about the value of some item. Obviously, depending
on findings of fact or value, one party may stand to gain more than the
other. Consequently, in such a case, a party may seek to persuade the
other that its own version of the facts or its own valuation formula is the
one which they should use. To avoid this problem, which could entail a
competitive conflict, the parties could agree to some "objective" deter-
mination of the facts or valuation, e.g., using a neutral factfinder or taking
the average of three appraisals. In other words, rather than selecting an
option just because one party prefers it, the negotiators can attempt to
agree on objective criteria for choosing among the options. The negotia-
tion may thus, for a time, shift from a discussion about various proposals
to a discussion or negotiation over what principles the parties can mutually
agree to accept to help them choose between the options.
Note, however, that while the parties can attempt to solve the
gain distribution problem in a principled way, they can also attempt to
deploy those principles that are most advantageous to them. Suppose, for
example, that you and I each need a good computer and agree to share the
$3000 cost of buying one. Neither of us has enough spare money to buy
the computer on our own and neither of us needs to use it full-time. Now,
of the $3000 cost, I put in $2000 and you put in $1000. How do we
divide up use of the equipment?
Two of the obvious principles we could use to allocate our use-
share are equity and equality.' I am likely to assert that we should share
use of the computer in proportion to our contributions to its purchase.
You could respond that we should share equally, for although I contributed
more, I would have no computer but for you. If I agree with you, and we
adopt the equality principle, you obtain a share beyond your contribution.
This example thus illustrates the share-division problem and demonstrates
that, even when parties attempt to come to principled agreements,
particular principles will often favor one side more than the other in share-
24. Id. at 182.
25. SAMUEL B. BACHARACH & E.J. LAWLER, BARGAINING, POWER, TAcTICS, AND
OUTCOMES 175 (1981).
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distribution.' It also suggests that parties are likely to advance those
division principles which most advantage them.
Resort to "objective" principles is an effort to avoid share al-
location through competitive claiming, but many "objective" principles in
application have the effect of advantaging one claimant or another. The
aim behind the idea, of course, is to keep problem-solving bargaining
clean of competitive conflict and to ensure fair resolutions. This is not as
easy to accomplish as it superficially appears, and negotiators must closely
attend the division of gains and scrutinize preferred division principles
with great care.
F. Possible Limits on Interest-based Bargaining
Interest-based bargaining opens possibilities foreclosed in position-
based bargaining and can result in more creative and satisfactory
agreements than is possible in position-based bargaining. It is not,
however, a bargaining strategy that succeeds in all bargaining situ-
ations.' Parties' fundamental interests sometimes conflict so strongly
that focusing on them might cause a breakdown in negotiations. In such
circumstances, it is better for the parties to focus on concrete and
pragmatic issues, involving lower-level interests, which they may be able
to resolve.' Beyond this, in bargaining situations where there is a
considerable power imbalance between the parties, the party with the
greater power may see no benefit from interest-bargaining and resist it for
that reason.
1. Fundamental Value Conflicts
The most obvious example of a case where interest-based
bargaining will not work involves parties who frame issues in terms of
26. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 137-138.
27. Some of the popular literature promoting interest-based bargaining is a bit
pollyannish, following a rhetorical strategy of trying to convince readers that interest-based
bargaining is a "magical" tool for producing problem-solving results. My own experience as
a facilitator and mediator, however, suggests that some problems do not have ingenious
solutions, but are resolved simply by a decision. The solution, if you want to call it that, is a
decision that people can live with. In such circumstances, negotiating is not so much a
question of finding a "right" answer that will meet everyone's interests, but is really a matter
of working through - facing the ambiguities of the situation, the conflicting feelings and
values, accepting what each has to give up, and becoming comfortable with the less than
optimal result.
28. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 69.
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fundamental values or ideologies which conflict." A few years ago, it
would have been impossible for the United States and the Soviet Union to
negotiate over fundamental changes in their political systems and basic
ideologies, but both countries were able to reach a variety of lower-level
agreements ranging from cultural exchanges to arms control. Similarly,
while the United States and Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran could not negotiate
about the respective values of Western capitalist civilization and Islamic
fundamentalism, they were able to negotiate over the American hostages
and Iran's frozen assets in the United States.
In both of these cases, although the parties did engage in some
kind of interest-bargaining, it is clear that they could not have bargained
over their fundamental belief systems. The lesson is that where basic
interests are strongly opposed - more likely when the parties are each
trying to realize fundamental values or ideologies which conflict - the
parties will sometimes do better to focus on intermediate, pragmatic in-
terests.
2. Interest-bargaining and Significant
Bargaining Power Imbalances
Nothing requires parties to bargain in problem-solving rather than
competitive ways. Because problem-solving bargaining can lead to gains
or better results for both sides than can competitive bargaining, and can
also enhance relationships, it generally appears to be a better way to
negotiate than competing. Why then, aside from the inveterate
competitors, would a party ever choose to bargain competitively rather
than integratively?
Most starkly put, when a party has the power to get what it wants
from another, and is unconcerned with any potential negative
consequences, it has no reason to engage in interest-bargaining. In other
words, parties roughly equal in bargaining power, and parties actually
dependent on one another, are most likely to interest-bargain because
neither can dominate. Where a party can dominate without cost to itself,
however, it has no reason to interest-bargain. Thus, there will be
occasions when a party will choose not to engage in interest bargaining
because it perceives that it is better served by positional bargaining on a
particular issue. This situation might occur when a particular issue and its
surrounding circumstances give a party enhanced power or leverage in a
negotiation.3" For example, an employee on whom a firm heavily relies,
29. Id.
30. Id. at 70.
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concerned only with negotiating a possible salary increase would probably
be foolish not to use an offer of a position at another organization at a
higher salary as a lever to get the desired increase. Similarly, if a real
estate development company failed to prepare an adequate environmental
impact report on a proposed new development project, groups seeking to
block or reorient it to reduce potential adverse environmental consequences
might wish to use the leverage that issue creates to exact gains.
3
'
Even so, efforts to interest-bargain may, in many cases, moderate
domination moves. By moving the negotiation to the level of interests, the
parties expand the scope of their considerations. They may learn they are
dependent on one another in ways they had not realized. The development
company may have other planned projects of interest to the groups now
opposing the company. It might, therefore, be willing to trade significant
mitigating changes in its other projects to avoid the delay that litigation
over the environmental impact report on this project would create. Even
in the case where the parties do not uncover dependencies which change
their perception of the power balance between them, the dominant party
may, nonetheless, discover there are potential benefits from working to-
gether that, overall, outweigh the immediate gain that party can extract.32
31. Both examples assume that the dominant party has considered the full range of its
possible interests, yet has found no reason not to attempt to appropriate most of the gain for
itself.
32. Here is a summary of the general steps in interest-based bargaining, generally
following the models found in FISHER & URY, supra note 2, and LAX AND SEBENIUS, supra
note 2:
1. Determine what your interests or the interests of your principal really are.
2. Establish your best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
3. Negotiate a cooperative, problem-solving bargaining process - that is, attempt
to make the negotiation a mutual search for ways to satisfy both parties' interests.
4. Identify issues and problems between the parties by revealing interests and
discovering those of the other side. Explore interests and differences of views and
perceptions of the situation. In this process, do not attempt to compromise in-
terests, or "give on them" in an effort to be reasonable. Instead, stay committed
to attempting to satisfy your interests completely.
5. Focus the discussion on the parties' interests, not on their positions.
6. Clearly state the parties' interests, needs, and values, and define any conflicts
or problems they create as between the parties. Avoid emotion-laden conflict by
accepting the other's viewpoints and by focusing discussion on interests and
problems.
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G. Alternatives to Negotiation
Negotiating with others is not always the best way to reach one's
goals, and a party should negotiate to agreement only when the negotiation
brings better results than those obtainable without negotiation. Prior to
undertaking any negotiation, a party should determine what its best alter-
natives to negotiation are -- in other words, decide what it will do if there
is no negotiation or if the negotiation fails to reach results that satisfy its
interests.' The party should be very specific and state exactly what it
will do if the negotiation fails, for the only reason to negotiate is to realize
a gain or benefit not obtainable without agreement. If it appears that the
negotiation will not produce a better result than one realizable without
negotiation, there is no point in continuing it. Alternatives to negotiation
thus provide the party with a way to measure success in negotiation and
to determine whether it should accept a negotiated agreement.
H. Information Gathering in Problem-solving
Problem-solving negotiation involves an attempt to understand
one's own needs, values, and objectives, and those of the other side.
Ideally, problem-solvers share information to discover their real conflicts,
7. Separate the process of inventing solutions from deciding what solutions to
adopt. Create value or alternative possibilities for agreement by jointly devising
solutions to the problems the parties perceive they are trying to solve; attempt to
surface solutions satisfactory to both sides by exploiting shared interests and
differences of valuation, forecasts, risk aversion, and time preferences.
8. Although the parties may collaborate to increase possible gains or to devise
various possible solutions to their jointly defined problems, they must yet devise
some way to decide which alternatives to select. As that decision will distribute
value between the parties, they must take care to analyze how it will do so.
To avoid a competitive struggle, the parties may attempt to find
"objective criteria" to help them select among proposed alternative solutions.
They can do this by framing this final problem-solving issue as a mutual search
for objective criteria, during which the parties ask for and seek principled
justifications for accepting, or deciding between, proposed solutions. This is more
difficult than it may seem, for few principles distribute neutrally, and it is impor-
tant to examine proposed principled distributions carefully.
9. Measure possible settlements by reference to concrete non-agreement
alternatives.
33. When a party does not have or cannot devise good alternatives to a negotiated
settlement, circumstances effectively force it to negotiate. It may nonetheless be able to
improve those alternatives it has and thereby enhance its bargaining power.
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to identify what each thinks is important, and to facilitate problem-solving
efforts. By contrast, competitors withhold and manipulate information to
maximize their own individual gains. Problem-solving negotiation is thus
a full information perspective of bargaining that calls upon the parties to
create and maintain a free, open, and rather complete flow of information.
If the parties each have full information, they will know what
their actual conflicts are. They will know which interests they share and
which they do not. They will also know how each of them perceives the
situation and what each hopes to accomplish through negotiation. If the
parties have this information and accurately perceive each other's point of
view, they can turn to a collaborative search for solutions that meet the
goals and objectives of both sides. When each knows what the other
needs, each may see how to meet the other's needs, while getting what he
needs as well.
1. Interests and Positions
Problem solving negotiation is interest-based bargaining.
Competitive negotiation and simple compromise negotiation, on the other
hand, involve position-based bargaining. Interests, as used here, comprise
the more abstract and perhaps intangible goals parties have in a given
negotiation: what the parties really care about for themselves, what they
aim to achieve through the negotiation, and what general needs the parties
hope to serve, whether economic, psychic, moral, relationship, short-term
or long-term.' Such interests should be contrasted with particular
positions the parties may take in a negotiation. Positions are the specific
demands parties make to realize their interests, and the relationship
between positions and interests is essentially a means-end relationship.
To take a simple example, suppose Noah decides to ask his boss
for a raise. Noah has a good job and already has a good income, but still
wants a raise. He does not really need the extra money, but would like to
have more disposable income. In his negotiation with his boss, Noah asks
for an additional $2000 a year, which would give him the same salary as
the highest paid employee in his department. Were Noah to examine his
motives more deeply, however, he would realize that he feels undervalued
and that what he really desires is recognition and a status equal to that of
the highest paid employee in his department. Although he is not clear
about it, when Noah takes the position that he needs a raise of $2000, he
is primarily trying to serve his status interest, not his financial interest.
Were Noah and his boss clear about this, rather than making his salary the
34. See FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 41-45.
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issue in the negotiation, they could focus on ways to give him the status
within the company that he desires.
This example shows that parties take positions in negotiation
because they believe that achieving them is a way to serve their deeper
purposes or interests. They may not have thought their position through
clearly or carefully enough. Espousing a wrong position, even promoting
a particular position at all, may cause a negotiation to focus on the wrong
issues. If Noah's boss has a strong need to save money, Noah's position
that salary is the issue will make the negotiation a difficult one. If,
however, both parties focus on why Noah wants a higher salary, they may
discover that the real issue is status, and that issue may be easier to
resolve. Discovering the parties' real interests allows negotiators to avoid
defining the issues in terms of positions which may not implicate those
interests. Thus, focusing on interests rather than positions helps the
parties define the real issues in the negotiation.
Interest-based negotiation opens up settlement possibilities not
only because it helps parties focus on the right issues, but also because
there may be many ways to satisfy the parties' actual interests. Paying
Noah an extra $2000 a year is one way to give him enhanced status.
Giving him a special title, a new position, or some other form of
recognition are all ways which may serve his employer's interests better
than the requested raise.
When bargaining positionally, the parties are in effect attempting
to impose their own predefined, unilateral solutions to the issues between
them. A position is really nothing more than a pre-conceived proposal for
resolving a difference or dispute, and the relationship between positions
and interests is a means-end relationship. Position-based bargaining
inclines parties to bargain competitively, each party advancing a means
designed to serve only its own interests. This frames a negotiation as an
"either-or" contest: "either we do what you want or we do what I want."
This framework leads to efforts by a party to dominate in order to have
his way. If these efforts do not succeed, the parties usually compromise
between their positions to reach agreement. Position-based bargaining thus
locks the parties into pre-determined solutions, possible contests of wills
over positions, and simple compromises between positions.
Interest-based bargaining by its nature expands the set of possible
outcomes with which the parties can work. Working at the deeper level of
interests gives parties a broader perspective on what may be involved in
the negotiation. The parties can increase the set of possible trade-offs or
considerations they can take into account and use to shape packages. As a
simple example, if the parties focus on winning positions, they will likely
ignore the implications their contest has for their future relationship.
Focus on short-term gain may entail future loss because the parties are
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
disinclined to deal with one another again. When they focus on interests,
however, they can see whether there is value in a continuing and
developing relationship and consider what that may be worth,
comparatively speaking. Interest-based bargaining thus permits parties to
examine their complete set of interests, and to consider ways in which
potential agreements can serve multiple ends.
2. Motivating Interests
It is rather common for parties to lean toward positional
bargaining. Positions are specific demands that are clear and direct
responses to the question, "What do you want?" People also find positions
useful in bargaining because positions provide reference points. In any
choice situation, you will be confused and ineffective unless you know
what you really want, and taking a position gives clarity of focus and
permits a bargainer to marshal arguments and resources to achieve a par-
ticularized goal. Positional bargaining is, to a certain degree, natural, and
even the most experienced of us may not initially frame a negotiating
problem in terms of the goals to be accomplished and the motivating
interests we're trying to serve.
The business deal that created the joint oil company giant, Royal
Dutch/Shell, exemplifies this.' Royal Dutch was principally an oil pro-
ducer and refiner with secure sources of oil. Shell was an oil trader,
transporter, and distributor. Although it had also begun to produce and
refine oil as well, its supply was not secure and it was in difficulty. The
two companies competed for markets, in addition to competing with other
strong oil companies such as Standard Oil. Royal Dutch and Shell decided
to amalgamate, for their respective strengths were complementary and the
combined company would be better able to compete with the other major
oil companies. Under the terms of the proposed agreement the Royal
Dutch management would manage Shell. However, Shell's principal
owner, Marcus Samuel, objected, taking the position that Shell should
continue to manage itself. His reason for taking that position was his fear
that Royal Dutch would not manage Shell in Shell's best interests, but
rather its own interests. To overcome this problem, Royal Dutch offered
to buy one quarter of Shell's shares, creating for itself an important stake
in Shell's best interests. Samuel conceded his position, but gained his
apparent real objective or deeper interest. Moving away from his original
position to the interest he was trying to serve made the final agreement
35. The story which follows in the text is related in DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIzE 126
(1991).
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possible.
What parties seek to realize in a given negotiation depends very
much on the parties and the circumstances. However, it is impossible to
list all motivating interests; all those things that people may value. The
parties themselves may not be clear about their underlying interests, but
may instead be more focused on positions. This may be true, in part,
because motivating interests are background factors and often seem
intangible or difficult to value concretely. Nonetheless, it is useful here to
list some general interests and values that may motivate most people.
Listing these interests gives a clearer sense of the bed-rock level of
interests which must be reached before beginning useful problem-solving
bargaining. 6
1. Economic interests: profit, reducing future costs, reducing
inefficiencies, developing new business opportunities;
2. Moral and psychological interests: integrity, principled be-
havior, fairness, self-respect and esteem, freedom from anxiety
and stress, adventure, excitement, peace of mind;
3. Ego or psychic interests: personal satisfaction, security, career,
good performance, respect;
4. Influence interests: reputation, authority, credibility, status,
good will;
5. Ideological interests: religious, political, or social beliefs;
6. Relationship interests: maintaining good relationships,
developing or enhancing possibilities of future relationships,
terminating detrimental relationships;
7. Freedom of action interests: preserving opportunities, avoiding
constraints and imposed obligations; avoiding undesirable
precedents;
8. Efficiency or security interests: protecting one's position,
property, and investments; establishing a good precedent,
developing a settled and reliable procedure or process for resolv-
36. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 70-74; see also FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at
49-50.
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ing problems or issues.
II. PRODUCTIVE COMPROMISE AS A SOLUTION IN
PROBLEM-SOLVING BARGAINING
Problem-solving bargaining aims at "win-win" solutions, usually
by attempting to increase the aniount of dividable gain available to the
parties in a negotiation. But it is not always possible to increase the size
of the pie, at least not in any simple way. In such situations, it is
important to understand the role of compromise in problem-solving
bargaining. Superficially, as compromise involves giving something up, it
is not immediately obvious how one can use compromise to increase gain.
Compromise bargaining requires concession, but even problem-
solving bargainers can find it difficult to concede on particular issues
where they find their interests in direct conflict with those of the other
side. .Sometimes there are results one must obtain, otherwise there is no
sense in negotiating. In such cases, the parties can still find a path to
productive agreement, a hop-scotch kind of path, made of stepping stones
each party lays rather than the divided lane of simple compromise. When
there are multiple issues under negotiation, the parties may find a track by
creating a mosaic of trade-offs between issues rather than seeking
compromise on each issue. In other words, the compromise involves
trading across issues rather than within issues.37
A. Trade-offs, Log-rolling and Packaging
Multi-issue negotiations offer possibilities of trade-offs as between
issues because parties with diverse perspectives may value various issues
differently. When parties in a multi-issue negotiation negotiate each issue
to separate conclusion, they cannot perceive how their different valuations
of different issues could lead to trade-offs. Instead, their only way to
reach agreement is to give way or compromise on each issue. When the
parties explore all issues before striking deals, however, they may be able
to see how they can gain what they want on issues of importance to them.
In short, by ponceding on issues of less importance to them but of greater
importance to the other side, they may see ways to make trade-offs as
between issues and create a final package more beneficial to each side than
compromises on each issue.
When parties explore all the issues before seeking to settle any, it
37. Cf. RAIFFA, supra note 2, at 148.
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is also possible for the parties to log-roll, that is, exchange concessions on
different issues.' Log-rolling works when the parties are able to trade
off items of lower priority or value for those of higher priority or value.
The parties may be able to do this if they have different priorities and at
least one of them is aware of their respective priorities and can therefore
perceive the trade-offs.39
Negotiations open up the possibility of log-rolling when the
parties systematically explore the various issues between them, seeking to
discover how strongly each side feels about the respective issues. This
usually occurs either through express information exchanges or their
substitutes, exchanges of proposals and counterproposals. In effect, in a
trial and error process, the parties explore each other's limits or preferred
outcomes over the full range of issues. Knowing their own priorities and
preferences on the various issues, they are then in a position to propose
packages." That is, the parties contingently propose different com-
binations of concessions over the various issues, some more favorable to
one side than the other, until each side concludes it has done as well as it
can.
41
To get a sense of how this works, take the example of two
parties, Gina and Mike, negotiating over three issues. To simplify
matters, assume that there are three possible outcomes on each issue,
38. PR UiTr & RUBIN, supra note 13, at 145.
39. Id. at 146.
40. Log-rolling presumes some way for each side to determine the other side's priorities.
This is not difficult when the parties trust one another and are equally revealing. It can be
problematic when the parties may behave opportunistically, however, for disclosure of priori-
ties can open one up to exploitation. If a party reveals that certain items are important to it,
the other side could use the information, in effect, to hold those items ransom.
Consequently, parties consciously attempting to log-roll need first to ascertain whether it is
safe to do so.
41. Obviously, even if the parties enter negotiations knowing their priorities, information
they receive in the negotiation may cause them to reassess and alter them. Indeed, there is a
clear risk in too rigid pre-negotiation prioritization, for if the parties prioritize the same way,
they will end in competitive conflict. In such a situation, a break in negotiation to allow each
side to process the information and reassess it's priorities may work wonders.
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and that Gina and Mike have prioritized or valued the possible outcomes
by assigning a point-value to them, as follows:42
Gina Mike
outcomes outcomes
issues A 1 A B
r 40 20 10 10 15 30 •
10 "20 30 20 30 10
A 20 30 10 40 20 10
Now, as Gina and Mike bargain, they discover that on issue P,
outcome A is very important to Gina, but not as important to Mike, who
values outcome C more highly than A. On issue E, however, Mike values
outcome B over other possible outcomes, while Gina values C over other
outcomes. As they continue to work through the issues, they will
progressively discover how each values the possible outcomes on the
different issues - most likely through the intensity with which they
respectively bargain for various outcomes.
To begin to work toward agreement, each will likely propose
trading-off outcomes on some issues for outcomes on others. When the
parties incorporate all issues in the bargaining and proposals, they will, in
effect, be proposing different possible packages. For example, Mike
might propose package P-C, E-B, A-A. Gina would propose package P-
A, E-C, A-B. Mike's package gives Gina 50 value points on her scale and
himself 100 on his scale. Gina's package gives her 100 value points and
Mike 40 value points. Neither would likely accept those packages because
each would perceive the possibility of greater gain from some other
package.
As a second packaging effort, Mike might then propose P-B, E-B
and A-A. This package would give him 80 points and Gina 60 points.
Gina could respond with package P-B, E-C, and A-B. This package
would give her 80 points and Mike 60. The parties would continue to
experiment with packages in this way until it became clear to each of them
42. Plainly, most people don't quantify their valuations of outcomes. Indeed, many
outcomes we might value in a particular negotiation don't lend themselves to quantification
although it is a useful exercise to try to do it. Then, too, quantification may introduce a false
precision in valuation which really does not exist in life. Nonetheless, quantifying valuation
is useful because it helps parties clarify their values, and it facilitates comparisons and
judgments otherwise difficult to make.
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that some particular package was the best that they could get.
B. Bargaining Efficiency
Suppose that Gina and Mike negotiate the three issues between
them one at a time. Assuming that each is trying to maximize gain for
each issue, the likely result is a compromise on each issue. For example,
they might agree on outcome B on each issue. If we tally their total points
for such an agreement, Gina ends up with 70 points and Mike with 65.
Assume now, however, that the parties consider all issues and
outcomes together. They can discuss them serially, but they hold off
making offers and counteroffers until they have discussed all issues, and
then make offers and counteroffers as packages of preferred outcomes
over all the issues. They experiment with different packages and finally
settle on the following: r-A, E-B, A-A. If we again tally their points, we
see that Gina ends up with 80 points and that Mike also ends up with 80.
In other words, through the trade-offs they made across all the issues, they
are each better off than they would have been in the first scenario. In the
first scenario, each party left gains on the table, that is, the parties did not
bargain efficiently.' Had they in effect shared information about the
way they valued the issues -- through proposing trades and possible
packages of outcomes across all issues -- they would have discovered, and
could have claimed, additional value.
This phenomenon of inefficient bargaining or gains left on the
table is a well-known and studied feature of negotiation." In fact, in all
multi-issue negotiations where outcomes are quantifiable, it is possible,
with full information from all sides, to construct and graph the set of all
possible solutions to the negotiation problem.
43. RAIFFA, supra note 2, at 138.
44. See id. at 138-142, 148-165.
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Here is an example of such a graph in a hypothetical negotiation.
90
so
Gain 70
for
Gina 50
40
30
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Fareto optimal curve
Efficient frontier Gain for Mike
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The curve, which defines all the possible maximal solutions to the
negotiation problem, is called the pareto optimal curve s or the efficient
frontier. In the negotiation, no one can do better than to reach some point
on this curve.
Looking at negotiation solutions that fall within the quadrant
defined by the curve, for example, solution A, we see that the parties left
some gains on the table. They could have reached the curve, but did not.
Now compare solution C to solution A. Each party did better. Such a
solution is said to be pareto superior.' That is, in terms of bargaining
efficiency, any move which leaves at least one party better off without
leaving the other party worse off is a move toward greater efficiency.
In negotiation, it is clearly desirable for the parties to attempt to
bargain efficiently in this manner; indeed, the ideal is to reach solutions
like Z, which are on the frontier. Parties stand only to gain, not lose, if
they can find and trade all potential gains on the table between them.
They are most likely to do this if they share information or if the
negotiation process permits them contingently to compare possible
outcomes across all issues. Those parties who assume that there is more
value to be gained, which they can find if they systematically exhaust the
permutations and combinations of issues and outcomes, are most likely to
find it.
1. Linking Issues
Linking or adding issues to a negotiation can be either a
competitive or cooperative tactic.47 This move works cooperatively when
it creates possibilities of trade-offs that otherwise would not exist.
As a linking example, take Gina and Mike's negotiation and
suppose that initially they are negotiating only issue I', and that their
45. The curve, or frontier, is named after Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian economist and
sociologist, and is defined as "the locus of the achievable joint evaluations from which no
joint gains are possible." Id. at 139.
46. STEVEN J. BRAMS, NEGOTIATION GAMES 103-104 (1990).
47. Linking can be competitive when parties add or link issues to a negotiation not
because they are implicit in or logically related to the central issues in the negotiation, but be-
cause they seek leverage in it. Successful linking will require the other side to address the
linked issue, which might not occur but for the need to negotiate the other issues in the nego-
tiation. Linkage may also enhance the linker's bargaining position and power regarding the
issues central to the negotiation, and is a likely tactic for negotiation parties with less power.
LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 138-139, 221-226.
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payoffs for outcomes are as shown below.
Gina
outcomes
40 20 10
Mike
outcomes
A D
10 15 30
Gina will argue most strongly for outcome A, Mike for C. They might
compromise on B, where they each, in effect, lose half of their maximum
possible gain. If they add issue E, however - assuming it is a matter of
concern to them - and agree on package, r-A, E-B, then Gina obtains 60
of a possible 70 points of value, or 6/7 of what she wants, and Mike gets
45 of a possible 60 points, or 3/4 of what he wants.
issues
rzSle
Gina
outcomes
20 10
20 30
Mike
outcomes
15 30
30 10
2. Unlinking Issues
Negotiations can stymie over particular linked issues which the
parties cannot reconcile. In such cases, the parties must re-examine their
priorities to determine, with the benefit of information gathered in the
negotiation, what is most important to them. Sometimes, by dropping or
unlinking an issue holding up agreement, the parties can successfully ne-
gotiate remaining issues.
As an unlinking example, suppose that Gina and Mike are
negotiating all the issues 1, E, and A, except that the array of outcomes
has the following payoff schedule for them.
Gina
outcomes
A fl
40 20 10
10 20 30
10 5 50
Mike
outcomes
B D
10 15 30
20 30 10
50 10 5
1-
issues
r
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Obviously, issue A has much of value to each of them, but their
valuation of outcomes is completely opposite. Their negotiation of this
issue is likely to be highly competitive and contentious. There is just too
much value riding on the issue for them not to fight over it. In fact, there
is so much value riding on issue A, that bargaining is likely to distort or
seriously complicate bargaining on issues r and E. Either Gina or Mike
would have to accept their worst outcomes on the other issues to prevail
on A. Thus, if A is a major impediment to agreement on other issues,
they can agree not to discuss it and more productively work on issues 1r
and E.
Realistic examples of linking and unlinking to facilitate
compromise and agreement are not difficult to create. To take a prosaic
instance of linking, suppose a company executive wants a particular
employee to take on a new and difficult task. The employee, however,
already feels overworked and would resist the assignment. This particular
employee, however, has also complained for some time that she lacks the
proper resources to do her job well, in particular, that she needs a state of
the art computer work station. It is easy to see how linking these two is-
sues may produce movement on each. Some sort of compromise would be
satisfactory to both parties, whereas keeping them separate may result in a
stalemate on both issues.
More dramatically, the abortion controversy illustrates the
possible value of unlinking. Those who favor abortion and those who
oppose it often confront one another on issues that each side feels
implicates their fundamental values regarding abortion and human life, a
point on which the parties are irreconcilably opposed. Suppose
representatives of these two opposing groups meet to discuss a possible
parental notification law concerning under-age girls seeking abortions. If
these groups can agree not to discuss the abortion issue itself, they may be
able to make some progress toward agreement on a parental notification
statute. Otherwise, they are likely doomed to continued fighting.'
3. Trade-off Bargaining and Contingent Agreement
There is good advice in the old negotiation saying, "Nothing is
final until everything is settled." When there are too many issues to con-
48. Linkage is also likely to occur in negotiations on behalf of a group composed of
parties having differing, but perhaps related interests. The need to maintain group cohesion
means that the negotiator may not be able to unlink issues important to part of the group.
When there is such group pressure to keep an issue linked, the only way to unlink it may be
to otherwise address or satisfy the needs of that element of the group responsible for the
linkage. Id. at 224, 229-230.
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sider simultaneously, the parties can take up issues sequentially, but make
resolution of them tentative and dependent on how other issues are
resolved, This procedure opens the possibility of trade-off bargaining.
The parties can do this expressly by agreeing in advance that their
discussion is exploratory and tentative and that they will decide at the end
of the negotiation whether to settle. As they move through the issues they
can indicate the possible agreements. Alternatively, the parties can simply
signal they will consider making a concession on a given issue and then
move on to explore a new issue, e.g., "I think we'll be able to resolve that
one without too much difficulty. Now let's talk about the next issue."
Keeping agreements tentative permits their amendment in the light
of new information. Even tentative agreements create a sense of progress
and give psychological impetus to work through as yet unresolved issues.
This suggests that it is beneficial for bargainers to attempt to work through
issues sequentially from least to most contentious.
4. Agreement Costs as Linkable and Tradable
A party can experience a direct cost from an agreement and resist
agreeing for that reason. Sometimes it is possible for the party benefitting
from the agreement to pay those costs and thereby induce the other to
agree.49  Airline practices on overbooking flights provide a simple
example. Anticipating no-shows, airlines sometimes overbook flights, but
then must deal with angry and frustrated passengers when they all show
up, as the airline cannot accommodate them all. Typically, the airline
will ask for volunteers to take a later flight, and may also provide a sweet-
ener, in the form of a cash payment or voucher for free travel, to pay for
the delay costs the volunteer experiences. Dealing directly with the costs
that a proposed agreement may entail thus links that issue and permits the
parties to create a trade-off agreement incorporating it.
This example actually demonstrates two different ways of trading-
off or making compensation in order to secure an agreement, specific and
non-specific compensation."0 In making specific compensation, a party
pays or alleviates exactly those costs the other side experiences. In
making non-specific compensation, a party pays the other in different kind
or different "coin.""1 In the example, providing a later flight pays the
other in the travel originally desired. The money or voucher pays or
"buys" the intangible cost of delay.
49. Cf. RAIFFA, supra note 2, at 316.
50. PRurrr & RUBIN, supra note 13, at 144-145.
51. Id.
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In any given negotiation, the specific compensation required is
apparent, at least to the side experiencing the cost, for it comprises exactly
that loss it has.' Non-specific compensation, however, is another
matter, for only the other side can determine whether it values something
else, which the party can provide, sufficiently to constitute a satisfactory
replacement for those costs the agreement imposes. In the airline ex-
ample, if someone is trying to get home in an emergency, money may not
compensate for the delay.
In other words, non-specific compensation pays or provides gain
to the side experiencing the costs in some coin that party values, but
which itself is not otherwise directly involved in the issues being nego-
tiated. Plainly, it is a kind of trade-off introduced into the negotiation in
order to secure agreement. To do this, however, the party willing to pay
non-specific compensation must discover what else, other than those
interests specifically involved in the negotiation, the other party values.
A recent and important example of non-specific compensation
involves the alliance the United States drew together to face Iraq in the
Persian Gulf. Apparently, in order to secure Egypt's agreement to send
troops to Saudi Arabia, the United States agreed to forgive the $6.7 billion
military debt Egypt owed the United States.s0 While Egypt's direct
costs in joining the Gulf forces are not clear, Egypt undoubtedly con-
templated domestic problems arising from allying itself with the West
against a Muslim state. In addition, Egypt had many thousands of its
citizens working in Iraq, sending considerable income home and greatly
assisting the Egyptian economy. Forgiving Egypt's foreign debt alleviated
some of these costs and plainly was important enough to Egypt, together
with perhaps other factors, to persuade it to accept the direct costs of
joining the allies.
C. Future Costs and Precedent
There are other "costs of agreement" concerns parties may have
which cause them to resist agreement. Two related concerns are that the
agreement may be misinterpreted by other parties and that the agreement
52. Obviously, in some cases the costs of a proposed agreement may not be clear, even
to the party which will experience them, for those costs may turn on contingencies. In such
a case, the parties may find a compensation formula which incorporates the contingencies as
variables. There will also be cases where the parties dispute what the costs of agreement
may be, which would make either the existence or amount of the costs themselves an issue in
the negotiation.
53. Michael Ross & Melissa Healy, Cheney, Baker Silent on Attacking Iraq, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at A9.
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may establish a precedent for other negotiations. A party who fears either
of these things is worried not so much about the present agreement, but
about its future consequences.
When future consequences are an issue, there are a number of
possible trade-offs. Most evident is an agreement to keep agreement terms
confidential or an agreement that the parties will not treat the settlement as
precedent. " Similarly, if the concern is that the agreement may create a
precedent for other negotiating parties or create some problem of image or
face loss,' the currently agreeing parties may be able to devise some
formula which avoids this problem, for example through the shaping of the
agreement itself or an agreement about how to describe and publicize the
agreement. Similarly, the parties can deny that the settlement constitutes a
precedent and emphasize the special circumstances which gave rise to it.
In general, compromise and trade-off bargaining are important
ways to solve the problem of satisfying conflicting interests in bargaining.
To work trades successfully, however, negotiating parties need to know,
hopefully in advance of negotiation, what they have to trade and how they
value various possible trades. This is the subject of the next section.
III. FACILITATING EFFICIENT TRADE-OFFS
IN PROBLEM-SOLVING BARGAINING
A. Interests and Issues
In order to negotiate well, one must know what issues are likely
to arise in a negotiation. In simple negotiations, or in standardized
negotiations such as employment contracts, the issues are usually quite
predictable. For example, in employment contracts, the obvious issues are
salary, length of contract, position and duties, and vacation time. In a
typical negotiation concerning a lease of office space, price per square
foot, building maintenance fees, common area fees, space redesign and
remodeling, parking spaces, and length of lease are issues fairly certain to
arise.
In other negotiations, some issues may be clear or anticipated,
while others are uncertain or even unsuspected. Suppose that, seeking to
take advantage of lowered interest rates, Jane seeks to refinance her house.
54. Saddam Hussein's refusal to withdraw his forces from Kuwait may have involved, in
part, some issue of potential loss of face and credibility as a leader in the Muslim world.
Obviously, if loss of face is a cost a party may experience, it is important for the parties to
find some formula that permits the affected party to protect or maintain its image or save
face.
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Her current home loan is at 9 % interest, and she wants to refinance it at a
lower rate of 7.5%. Although there seems to be no issue other than her
ability to qualify, when she talks to the bank about refinancing, she
discovers she will have to pay 2 "points," or 2% of the total loan amount
to the bank as its fee for making the loan. The bank also says it will re-
duce its fee to 1.5 points if Jane keeps a checking account at the bank and
authorizes an automatic deduction for her monthly payment. The bank
further tells her it will refinance her house at an even lower rate of 7.25%
if she agrees to open a credit line of at least $10,000, also secured by her
house. While Jane may find these offers attractive, she did not anticipate
them, and they raise issues she will need to decide.
Negotiation issues arise from the interaction of the negotiating
parties' interests. If Jane is a good credit risk, the bank's interest in
making a profit on money it lends, and assuring payment, explains its
offer to Jane. The automatic checking account deduction gives it payment
priority and security, and the line of credit offer, if accepted, makes for a
larger loan, also secured by the house. For her part, Jane's interest in a
lower loan fee and a lower interest rate make the bank's offer attractive.
Nonetheless, she may have other interests which make it problematic to
accept. For example, she may keep money in another bank, with which
she has good relations that she wants to preserve. She may also think it
unwise to have access to a $10,000 credit account, as she wishes to keep
her overall debt load as low as possible and does not want an open
temptation to spend. Jane will have to weigh her several interests
carefully in order to make a decision regarding these issues the bank's
offer raises for her.
Plainly, figuring out one's interests is important because they
will, together with the other party's interests, define the issues in the
negotiation. Furthermore, one's interests vary from situation to situation,
and have varying weights in different contexts. Negotiations often affect
multiple interests that a party has. Depending on how negotiation issues
are resolved, those interests may be affected in different ways and to
different degrees. Multi-issue negotiations open possibilities of different
"packages" or combinations of ways issues can be resolved. In such
circumstances, a negotiator often finds decisions whether to accept ne-
gotiation proposals difficult to make because he confronts choices not
considered before and does not know how to compare and value the
possible trade-offs. In addition, the speed and pace of such negotiations,
and the involvement of multiple parties can compound the difficulty of
figuring out how a particular proposal affects one's interests.
For example, the Law of the Sea Treaty Negotiation involved
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more than 150 countries with very different interests and ideologies' and
hundreds of complicated, often interlocking issues, concerning territorial
seas, the rights of land-locked countries, fishing zones, navigational
freedom, ownership of the sea-bed, sea-bed mining, commercial mining
rights, the role and authority of the United Nations, and the like.
While few negotiations are this large, momentous, and
complicated, many negotiations do present choices that are difficult for the
negotiator to value and assess. When parties are not clear about exactly
what it is they seek from a negotiation, or when they are surprised by
issues that arise, they may not be able to protect or further their interests.
Consequently, it is important for a party to think through impending
negotiations, how they implicate her interests and how she values or
weighs them, what her preferences and priorities are. This knowledge
will help her to compare different possible agreements and determine
which is best for her. In these cases, the negotiator should have some
method or process for carrying out a comparative assessment of relative
preferences. 6
1. Figuring Out Fundamental Interests
Deciding what you value, and how much -- what you are willing
to give for what - requires you to analyze your fundamental interests and
how the pending negotiation might affect them or contribute toward realiz-
ing them. Usually, as you begin to think about an upcoming negotiation,
you have some sense of what you want from it and what the issues are
likely to be. To discover your fundamental interests, simply begin by
making a list of what you think will be involved in the negotiation, the
issues that are important to you. Then go over the list, and for each item
on it, ask yourself why that item is important. Analyze the reasons you
offer for holding these items important, and ask again why those are
important to you. Eventually, you will reach a bedrock level where you
cannot go further, where you cannot find any reason for an item's
importance other than a recognition that it is important. When you have
reached that level, you have identified an interest that's fundamental to
55. JAMEs K. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (1984).
56. This is true whether one negotiates for oneself or a client. When working for a
client, the negotiator must have a way to get the client to address and decide what is most
important and what configuration of packages or outcomes will best satisfy his or her
interests. See infra note 59 for an outline of quantification procedures.
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you. 7
A company is negotiating to buy a 100 acre 'tract of land from a
farmer who owns 1000 acres. The company intends to build family
housing and a commercial center on the property. One item it wishes to
discuss in purchase negotiations is whether there are any toxic substances
on the site. Why is that item important? Well, if there are toxic
substances on the site, the site may not be developable, or clean-up may
cost the company more than it can pay and yet make a profit, or the
company may face toxic substances liability suits sometime in the future
after it has developed the site. Why are these important to the company?
Obviously, all these reasons relate to the financial viability of the project.
But the last reason also implicates the company's reputation, future
business prospects, and a desire to avoid debilitating litigation. Why are
these important? They too relate to financial viability or profitability, but
also to company survival, integrity, and stature. Why are these important?
It is hard to push them back further. They just are important; they are
fundamental.
Having identified one's own fundamental interests in this way, the
negotiator should try to identify the other side's fundamental interests as
well. This allows the negotiator to determine which issues are likely to be
important to the other side. There may be issues that are of mutual
importance to each side. Other issues may be of immediate concern only
to one side or the other. Nonetheless, whatever is an issue for one side
will be an issue in the negotiation, and the other side will have to deal
with it in some way. Anticipating the other side's issues enables a
negotiator to figure out possible trade-offs.
In the land purchase example above, suppose the development
company discovers that the farmer is in financial difficulty and has a large
farm mortgage balloon payment due within three months. The farmer has
a clear financial interest in making the sale, and his financial need is likely
to make the transaction closing date quite important to him. The closing
date may or may not be as important to the development company, but it
is most useful to the company to know that it may be important to the
farmer.
2. Figuring Out Possible Outcomes
Issues grow out of interests, and identifying each side's
fundamental interests is essential to figuring out the possible issues in a
57. See RALPH L. KEENEY, VALuE-FoCUSED THINKING 65-69 (1992); see also Ralph L.
Keeney & Howard Raiffa, Securing and Analyzing Values, in NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 131,
148-149 (H. Peyton Young ed., 1991).
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negotiation. Once you have listed the issues the negotiation will likely
involve, it is important to try to specify the possible resolutions or range
of outcomes for each issue. For example, in the land sale hypothetical,
we have thus far posed two issues. For each issue, we can pose possible
outcomes, for example:
Issue Outcomes
toxic 1. no toxic substances
substances 2. toxic substances minor,
readily remediable
3. toxic substances significant
- but reduced purchase price
4. toxic substances significant
- no reduction in price, but
hold harmless clause
5. toxic substances significant
- no reduction in price,
take land as is
6. toxic substances an
insuperable problem
Issue Outcomes
transaction closing 1. 6 months
date 2. 3 months
3. 1 month
After the negotiator specifies the range of outcomes for each issue
in this fashion, she can then rank or weigh issues and outcome
preferences. If the issues and outcomes lend themselves to it, the planner
can quantify them in accordance with the additive scoring model described
below.' If not, the planner can make a qualitative assessment of issues
and outcomes, trying to determine the relative importance or weight she
accords each issue and her outcome preferences within and across issues.
B. Valuing Outcomes
Merely identifying issues and possible outcomes, however, is not
quite enough. In order to trade, a negotiator must have a sense of the
58. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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value of the items traded. In other words, the negotiator needs to look at
the array of possible or probable interests and outcomes implicated in the
negotiation, and assign values to them, for himself and the other partici-
pants. Assigning value may be a matter of identifying preferences, out-
come priorities, or even attempting to quantify particular outcomes by
giving them a relative numerical weight.
Valuing possible outcomes in this way greatly facilitates intelligent
and efficient bargaining. Having assigned relative values to different out-
comes prior to negotiation, the negotiator is well-prepared to assess
different packages of proposals during the negotiation and to make package
adjustments or counterproposals having more value to him.
Valuing potential outcomes is not easy work. It is often unclear,
without considerable thought and without obtaining more information,
whether outcome A is valued more than outcome B. Is a contract for one
year at 8 per cent preferred over a contract for 3 years at 4 per cent? The
answer depends on how well a particular outcome serves your interests.
There may even be a tension or some conflict between your in-
terests of which you are unaware until forced to confront it. As a simple
example, suppose you have to choose between two job offers: one, well-
paying, in a large, congested city, and the other, not as remunerative, in a
small, attractive city in the mountains. You are attracted to each, for you
like the culture, excitement, and opportunities of the large city, but you
also love the mountains and outdoor sports and are repelled by urban
squalor and congestion. This may be a hard choice, for choice of a job
implicates many more interests than those stated, including career
opportunities, relationships to partners and relatives, other opportunities,
life-style, and so on. Resolving which job to take is not necessarily an
easy question and may require much sorting through. It takes time to find
out what you really value.
This is also true regarding choice and decision-making in complex
negotiation. Unless the negotiation is extended over a long period of time,
the negotiators may have extraordinary difficulty in sorting out the
complexity of the issues presented because the choices regarding them bear
on their own best interests. Sorting this all out in advance, insofar as
possible, is the ideal way to do this.
1. Quantification.
A useful way to value interests for purposes of assessing possible
trade-offs and the attractiveness of various packages is to attempt to
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quantify them. 9 Many people are uncomfortable with the thought of
quantifying decisions, particularly where issues to be decided are
qualitative and appear unquantifiable. However, the aim of quantifying
decision-making is not to impose a false mathematical precision where
none can exist, but simply to give rational guidance in situations involving
confusing trade-offs. Quantification is a means of preparation that forces a
party to think through what it really values, and how much it values it, as
59. Here is an outline of the quantification procedure, adapted from LAX & SEBENIUS,
supra note 2, at 78-84. See also KEENEY, supra note 57, at 129.
a. Identify the interests the negotiation may involve. Consider both concrete inter-
ests, such as job security, and more abstract interests, such as the client's desire to
vindicate a principle or the precedential value of any particular settlement.
b. Assess the situation, role-playing if necessary, from the other side's point of
view and identify its interests.
c. Array the respective interests, note common and complementary interests, and
consider carefully where the parties' interests may conflict. Determine the
probable issues in the negotiation and the range of possible outcomes over all
issues.
d. Figure out the least and most attractive set of outcomes. Use these to compare
other possible outcomes.
e. Work out other possible outcomes and compare them. Try to determine which
outcomes are preferable to others. To help decide whether one outcome is
preferable to another, quantify outcomes as outlined below. Quantification may
seem a bit artificial, but the procedure is not rigid and is designed to reflect sub-
jective valuations and weightings.
1. Allocate 100 points over the range of issues. Assign weights among
issues by allocating points, or values, to each issue according to subjec-
tive feelings about their relative value.
2. After dividing up the 100 points between issues, allocate the points
assigned to a particular issue by assigning weights to each possible out-
come on that issue.
3. This procedure will produce a schedule or matrix of issues and
outcomes with point values assigned to each outcome on each issue.
Comparing different packages then simply involves adding up the points
the different packages produce. The package with the most points
should be the most preferred outcome.
f. Once a party works through this exercise, it should attempt to do the same thing
for the other side, role-playing if necessary, to get an understanding of its
interests, preferences, and priorities.
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compared to other things implicated in the decision.
The quantification procedure itself is not difficult. It is simply a
matter of deciding the relative importance of issues, and then, within
issues, deciding the relative importance of the possible outcomes. This
can be done by assigning points or various weights to issues and
outcomes.
Assume you represent a cable television company, and you want
to buy customer billing services from a data service company. The data
service company provides television usage monitoring devices, computers,
and software that will allow your company to do its billing automatically,
no matter what level of service your customers individually have. To
simplify the example, further assume there are only five issues to
negotiate: price, features, delivery date, training, and service.
After thorough discussion within your company, the CEO decides
that, given the range of possible outcomes for each issue, the company
should weigh the issues as follows:
Issue Points
Price 30
Features 20
Del. Date 10
Training 20
Service 20
Having determined the relative weight of the issues on a 100 point
scale, the CEO proceeds to analyze possible outcomes on each issue.
After she identifies them, she also weighs them by allocating point values
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based on the total number of points assigned to that issue:
Issue
Price
Outcomes
$1000/mo.
900/mo.
800/mo.
Features
Delivery Date
Training
Service
10 features
7 features
5 features
3 months
2 months
1 month
In house
Mixed - in
house &
at vendor
At vendor
24 hour call/
7 days a week
w/i one day
w/i two days
Quantifying in this fashion allows the cable company to compare the value
it holds for alternative packages that the vendor may propose.
The hypothetical presupposed that the issues in the negotiation
were independent of one another. When issues are independent, they can
be valued separately, as in the example, and points for each issue simply
added. In other words, simple, additive scoring systems work where
issues are independent of one another.
Where issues are interdependent, that is, where the value of one
issue depends on how another issue is resolved - quantification may be
more difficult. Suppose in the cable company example that the vendor ties
the monthly contract price to the number of features each billing service
package provides. In that case, those two issues can no longer be
considered separately. Nonetheless, they could be thought of as
Points
20
25
30
20
15
10
10
8
5
20
15
10
20
15
10
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comprising a unit, that is, as a single issue, weighted appropriately, and
then added to the other, independent issues."
2. Prioritizing or Preference Ordering Interests
Prioritizing or preference ordering interests is another way to
value them, useful either when interests are not readily quantifiable or
when one does not want to quantify. Essentially, prioritizing is a matter
of thinking hard about interests in order to become clear about their
relative importance or value. Indeed, this is the only way to figure out
what trade-offs to make. In other words, one needs to know what an
interest is worth compared to other interests one has in order to do this.
Valuing interests, particularly intangible interests, can be quite hard,
however. While one cannot expect exactness in weighing intangible
interests, almost any method of relative weighing brings greater clarity to
trade-off decisions. Thus, it is helpful to prioritize or preference-order in-
terests.
3. Comparative Valuation
Another way to comparatively value an intangible interest is to
ask how much one would be willing to pay for it if one could buy it on the
open market. For example, how much would a trial-averse woman
plaintiff in an automobile accident case be willing to pay to avoid the anxi-
ety of trial?
[Someone] asks her to imagine that a pharmacist offered to sell
her a magic potion that would completely eliminate the feeling
of anxiety from court proceedings. What would be the most
she would pay for the potion before going to trial? Would she
pay $10. "That's silly. Of course." Would she pay $100.
"Sure." $100,000? "Certainly not, that's one-third of my
minimum settlement! What about $50,000? "Probably not."
$1000. "I think so." $10,000? "Well, that's a tough one.
But, if push came to shove, the trial would be an awful experi-
ence so, probably yes." $25,000? "Maybe not, but I'm not
60. See Keeney & Raiffa, supra note 57, at 138-139. Simple additivity also does not
work, without adjustment, where a party must impose a reservation level or bottom line on
one or more issues. In that case, it is not possible simply to add points to compare different
deals, for it is necessary to insure that a minimum score is achieved on the designated issues.
Id. at 139.
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sure. ... " And so on. 61
C. Scoring Alternatives to Negotiation.
When quantifying, weighing, or preference ordering possible
issues and outcomes to help in negotiation decision-making, it is important
to attempt to do the same for one's alternatives to agreement. When the
possible alternatives to agreement involve the same issues as the negotia-
tion, this is not difficult, for there is direct comparability. In fact, in that
case, the alternatives to agreement essentially set the reservation prices for
the issues under negotiation.
For example, suppose you are a manufacturer seeking new
contracts for the purchase of raw materials. You have existing suppliers,
and you can continue using them if you cannot obtain better materials and
terms with new suppliers. Because your basic alternative to agreement is
to renew the old contracts, you can use those contract terms as your basis
for comparing possible new contracts. Some of the existing contract terms
will already be quantified - for example, price and quantity - and you can
readily quantify others - for example, quality - on some appropriate scale.
Once you have done this, you can readily compare old supplier contract
terms with those offered in negotiations with potential new suppliers.
Scoring your best alternatives to agreement will be more difficult
when they involve some issues other than, or in addition to, those which
the negotiation concerns. Suppose, in the manufacturing example, that one
of the manufacturer's old suppliers has proposed entering a joint venture
with the manufacturer, and the manufacturer is somewhat attracted to this
proposition. Whatever issues and possibilities the joint venture prospect
raised, they would not be a direct part of the manufacturer's negotiations
with potential new suppliers. In this case, the manufacturer's best al-
ternative to a new agreement, which involves this altogether different and
large issue of a possible joint venture, seems noncomparable with the
price, quantity, and quality issues involved in negotiations with new
suppliers.
Even in this situation, however, it is possible to assign values to
the issues in the alternative and those in the negotiation and obtain at least
rough comparability. There should be no difficulty in scoring those issues
which are common to the negotiation and the existing alternative, that is,
price, quantity, and quality.' For the issue that is different, the
possibility of a joint venture with an existing supplier, the manufacturer
61. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 2, at 75.
62. See Keeney & Raiffa, supra note 57, at 145.
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could estimate the value that has for it and add that to the scores for the
common issues. The manufacturer could then use this figure to compare
new supplier proposals.' To be acceptable, any new proposal must
deliver a value greater than that which the manufacturer calculated as
deriving from remaining with the old supplier and entering a joint venture
with it. "
IV. COGNITIVE DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATION
Notwithstanding the fullest understanding and most careful
planning and preparation, efforts to undertake problem-solving bargaining
can go awry because the parties do not take into account some of the ways
in which humans tend to make decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Researchers studying human problem-solving and decision-making have
63. Id.
64. Negotiation results also sometimes turn on contested facts: how and where the
parties decide to settle may depend on what facts they accept as a foundation for bargaining.
It is, therefore, important to know whether the parties will contest facts during the
negotiation, what facts they will contest, and how to settle the factual contest.
In some cases, settling the facts may simply require getting additional, or more
accurate, information, and it is obviously valuable to have such information available when
the negotiation begins. However, the source of such information may also be important, for
a negotiating party may not trust the information if it comes from an interested party
negotiating on the other side. Consequently, in preparing for a negotiation, it is important to
consider not only what information is necessary and useful, but also how to present the
information in a manner most acceptable to the other side - by using a trusted expert or a
neutral source.
There will be other cases, however, in which no amount of additional information
will help settle the facts. For example, consider the kinds of factual disputes typical in
lawsuit negotiations involving a tort suit over an alleged product failure or a performance suit
over an alleged contract. In these kinds of cases, the facts of what actually happened are
usually in dispute. Did the product fail when used as intended or did the user use the prod-
uct improperly? Did a party actually agree to enter a contract or did she not? Furthermore,
even if some of the basic facts are not in dispute, there may be a dispute about what those
facts mean, that is, how they should be interpreted. When the alleged contracting party said,
"Yeah, I'd like to see another order like that," did she actually order or was she just
hypothecating?
Arguing about facts in such cases is likely to result in an endless go-around,
neither side convincing the other because so much turns on how the facts are settled. What is
required, therefore, when the parties cannot accept each other's version of the facts and
cannot agree on a common version, is some method or process, acceptable to both sides, for
settling them. Thus, if this is a problem anticipated to arise in a negotiation, it is important
to think through alternative ways, likely to be agreeable to all parties, to settle facts, i.e.,
appointment of a neutral fact-finder, arbitration of facts, or some such means.
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long observed that our rationality is bounded.' Put otherwise, people
always make choices based on a simplified mental model of a real
situation, and unconsciously use judgmental strategies to make decisions
when asked to take risks or when interpreting ambiguous or otherwise
unclear information. In certain circumstances, these cognitive strategies,
sometimes called judgmental heuristics" or cognitive illusions,' can
even cause people to make objectively inconsistent or irrational choices.
While useful and efficient shortcuts that enable them to draw conclusions
about situations without consciously analyzing them, these strategies can
lead to misjudgment and erroneous decisions.
Negotiations usually require negotiators to make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty where choices depend on interpreting information
and taking or avoiding risks. This is particularly true where parties,
because they are somewhat non-trusting, have not agreed to share
information fully. Even in problem-solving bargaining, parties often have
to infer the information they need to make decisions. Where trade-offs are
involved, this occurs through the package proposals that the parties make
and evaluate. Negotiators must assess the information they obtain in
negotiation, and integrate it with other information they have. They must
assess other negotiators, examine and compare various possible outcomes,
and decide whether to agree and on what.
A. Reference Points
There appear to be two phases in common decision-making: a
simplification or "editing" phase, where the decision maker engages in a
preliminary analysis of the decision situation in order to simplify it; and an
evaluation phase, where the decision-maker decides which of the "edited"
choices is the best.'
Editing involves coding possible choices and assessing gains or
losses with respect to a defined reference point. For example, if I am
considering taking a new job, I will most likely take the characteristics of
my present job as a reference point to help me compare the new job and
make a decision about whether to accept a new position. I will take my
65. JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136-142, 151, 203
(1958).
66. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (1982).
67. See DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WAR EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 530 (1986).
68. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979).
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current salary, benefits, duties, and so on, as given and attempt to figure
out how the new job may better or worsen those items. 69
Obviously, people make judgments by reference to a defined
point, what that point is and how it is defined is quite important. In a
negotiation, a party's overall decision reference point is its reservation
price, that is, whatever it feels it must minimally obtain in order to agree
at all. In interest-based bargaining, a party establishes that point for itself
by figuring out its best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
1. Framing
People tend to adopt their status quo, whatever that may be in
what is at issue, as a reference point for their decision-making. What
people value, positively or negatively, are changes in their wealth or
welfare from their defined reference point."0
However a party establishes its reference point for assessing
negotiation offers, what is important to understand is that it may be
possible to induce a party to change its judgmental reference point. If a
party changes its reference point, it will, of necessity, perceive its decision
situation differently. In fact, this is what occurs when an interest-based
negotiator negotiates with a positional bargainer and persuades the latter to
look at the situation from the point of view of his interests rather than his
positions. Consequently, it is possible to shape the decisions people are.
likely to make by inducing them to consider their decision from a differ-
ent reference point.
In simpler terms, the way a problem is stated affects the way
persons approach and resolve it. The way negotiators define and view
issues affects the way they bargain and the concession and settlement
decisions they make. Issue-framing therefore can affect negotiation
results, and there are a variety of factors that negotiators should take into
account in framing their negotiations.
2. Risks of Loss or Gain
For most people, losses loom larger than gains, and we are
generally more willing to gamble to prevent or minimize losses than to
secure or maximize gains. Put otherwise, people are loss-averse, that is,
inclined to protect their current position and willing to take risks to pre-
69. Indeed, focusing on differences between one situation and another appears to be a
fundamental feature of human perception. We notice sound or color intensity only in relation
to current levels that we are experiencing.
70. See Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 68, at 273, 277.
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vent losses. They will not, however, take similar risks to secure gains.
People are risk-positive or even risk-seeking in taking action to prevent a
loss, but risk-averse in taking action to secure a gain.'
We can even expand these propositions somewhat. Persons
presented with a choice between a certain small gain and a possible larger
gain also tend to act conservatively, taking the small gain and not
gambling for the larger. On the other hand, where the situation is framed
as a choice between a small sure loss and a larger possible loss, people
will gamble to avoid the smaller loss. Consider the following example.'
Choose between:
a. a sure gain of $3000
b. an 80 percent chance of winning $4000 and a 20
percent chance of winning nothing.
In this situation, most people choose alternative a. When the problem is
reversed, however:
Choose between:
a. a sure loss of $3000
b. an 80 percent chance of losing $4000 and a 20 percent
chance of losing nothing
most people choose alternative b. In other words, people will take risks to
try to prevent a loss, but will not take equal risks to try to secure a gain.
It is often possible to frame a situation positively or negatively,
as a case of maximizing gains or minimizing losses. Consider a bettor at
a race track, having lost $140 on prior races and thinking about making a
$10 bet, in the final race, on a horse running at 15:1 odds.' The bettor
can look at the final bet as offering a $140 gain versus a $10 loss;
however, he may think of himself as having lost $140, with the prospect
of losing another $10, for a total of $150. It is easier to forego a gain
71. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456 (1981); see also Margaret A. Neale & Max H.
Bazerman, The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors
and Outcomes, 28 AcAD. MGMT. J. 34, 37-38 (1985).
72. Kevin McKean, Decisions, Decisions, DISCOVER, June 1985, at 22, 28.
73. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 71, at 456.
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than to suffer a loss, and parties facing possible losses are more likely to
take a chance than parties faced with the prospect of a possible gain.
Furthermore, a loss is less painful if thought of as part of a larger loss
rather than considered alone.74 Consequently, the bettor is more likely to
risk the bet if he frames his situation in terms of losses than in terms of
possible gain. He is more likely to make the bet if he thinks of himself as
trying to break even, incurring no overall losses, than if he focuses on
winning $140.
The way one frames an issue, therefore, affects the decision
made. In a negotiation, the issue frame as it bears on risk can affect both
the character of the bargaining and negotiation results. Negotiating parties
risk non-agreement by the positions they take and on which they stand
firm. If the parties are some distance apart, there will be no agreement
unless one or both concede to close the gap. In this situation, refusing to
concede or conceding too little constitute risky behavior. Making
concessions, by contrast, moves toward securing an agreement and is
therefore an attempt to avoid the risk of no agreement. Consequently, a
party that views a negotiation as an effort to minimize losses is more
likely to engage in hard-bargaining (risky behavior) than a party focused
on potential negotiation gains.
If all parties to a negotiation look upon it as an opportunity to
maximize gains, they will all make concessions and come to agreement
more easily and productively. Indeed, this is part of the theory of prob-
lem-solving bargaining. If a negotiator persuades the other side to view the
negotiation as an opportunity to secure a gain, she is framing the
negotiation in a way most likely to encourage the other side to make
concessions. 7
On the other hand, if a negotiator is attempting to hard-bargain,
she may do so by framing her own position in the negotiation as an effort
to prevent losses. With a risk-positive frame, she will be less likely to
make concessions and perhaps more likely to get them. Similarly if a
negotiator is seeking to get as much gain as possible from a negotiation,
she may frame her own situation negatively, as an effort to minimize
74. See McKean, supra note 72, at 3 1.
75. Doing so obviously requires the negotiator to listen carefully in order to discern just
how the other side is framing the negotiation or particular issues in it. Suppose, for example,
that a real estate broker is trying to negotiate the sale of some property. The prospective
buyer is hesitant and unenthusiastic, but the broker discovers that the buyer is worried about
the cash outlay. In other words, the buyer views himself as losing his financial liquidity. In
this situation, the broker might do well to frame the purchase as one which will protect the
buyer's wealth from inflation (no loss) and which may lead to a profit on resale in the future
(possible gain).
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losses, while attempting to persuade the other side to view its situation
positively, as an opportunity to secure gains.7' What this analysis
counsels the problem-solving negotiator is that she must determine the
other party's negotiation frame and, if necessary, seek to change it from a
risk positive frame to a risk-averse frame. It is apparent that under-
standing how parties frame a negotiation choice, and understanding how to
reframe it are essential to effective problem-solving negotiation. 7
3. Anchoring and Adjustment.
When people are uncertain, it is possible to center their attention
on a particular point merely by mentioning it. Then, when asked to make
a decision, the person so focused unconsciously uses that point as a
reference point for their decision. In other words, decision-makers adjust
their decision up or down from the noticed reference point. In effect,
focusing a person's attention on a certain point tethers or anchors his
judgment to the vicinity of the point.
This psychological phenomenon, appropriately called anchoring,
is easiest to demonstrate when people are asked to make estimates,
76. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Negotiator Rationality and Negotiator
Cognition: The Interactive Roles of Prescriptive and Descriptive Research, in NEGOTIATION
ANALYSIS 109, 121 (H. Peyton Young ed., 1991).
77. People also analyze a decision-situation -by dividing it into riskless and risky
components and focusing their attention on the risk. In comparing choices, they focus on the
differences between choices and disregard what is the same in the choices.
Suppose you want to start a business and invite a few people to invest in it. You
acknowledge that it is a risky venture and that anyone who invests in it could lose her capital.
Suppose you frame the offer in the following ways:
(1) the investor will have a share in the business and its profits equal to the'
percentage of her investment as a share of total investment, and a complete loss of capital if
the business fails;
(2) the same, except that, on business success, the investor will receive a fixed
return plus a percentage.
Simplified, the first formulation presents the investor with a risk while the second
presents her with a risk followed by a certainty. While both formulations involve the same
amount of risk, the second appears more attractive, and the investor is most likely to focus
on the difference.
One may invest money in a venture with some probability of losing
one's capital if the venture fails, and with a choice between a fixed
agreed return and a percentage of earnings if it succeeds. The isolation
effect implies that the contingent certainty of the fixed return enhances
the attractiveness of this option, relative to a risky venture with the
same probabilities and outcomes.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 68, at 272.
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although it operates in other situations as well. For example, subjects in
an experiment were asked to estimate what percentage of countries in the
United Nations were African.' Before making the estimate, however,
experimenters asked the subjects to state whether the percentage was
greater or less than a number chosen by spinning a wheel having the
numbers 1 through 100 on it. Unknown to the subjects, who supposed the
number selection was by chance, the experimenters rigged the wheel to
stop at 10 or 65. The subjects who saw the 10 made an average estimate
that the percentage of African countries was 25%. Those who saw 65
made an average estimate of 45%. Obviously, seeing the 10 and the 65
influenced the later estimates of the subjects, even though they believed
the numbers they saw were selected by chance.79
This experiment, and others like it, make it clear that it is
possible to affect people's judgments through using an anchor. In effect,
once focused on a point or alternative, people confine their search for
solutions within an area centered on the point. People use the focus as a
reference point for judgment and adjust from there.
The anchoring phenomenon is important in negotiation. A
negotiator can consciously attempt to anchor another party, and a
negotiator needs to be wary of being anchored. As interest-based
bargaining is focused on satisfying interests rather than focused on
particular means of satisfying interests, interest bargainers seem less
susceptible to anchoring than positional bargainers. However, interest-
based bargaining divides into phases of problem-definition, option genera-
tion, and selection of solutions, and involves both value-creation and
value-claiming. ° Roughly speaking, the option generation phase is the
value-creation stage, while the solution selection phase is the value-
claiming stage. It is at the value-claiming stage that interest-based
bargaining may turn competitive and where anchoring may occur and
shape decisions. In other words, anchoring is likely to occur during the
solution-selection phase, and, in fact, many parties attempting interest-
based bargaining focus inordinately on just one or two solutions rather
than consider all thoroughly and systematically.
B. Attribution Error
In the United States, most people, when observing someone
making a choice, attribute the choice to the actor's character or dis-
78. ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 121 (1988).
79. See id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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position. In other words, most people operate from the unconscious
premise that people behave as they do because of their dispositions. The
actor, however, usually explains his choice by reference to the immediate
situation, that is, factors he thought facing him that caused him to choose
one way rather than another.
I once observed a classroom during a lecture-discussion. During
the lecture, several female students raised their hands, but the professor
did not call on them. At last, he did call on a male student who had
raised his hand. A female student then challenged him, asserting that he
was obviously sexist as he had not earlier called on women students. The
professor, while taken aback, responded, "Well, perhaps. You will have
to judge, but I really wasn't ready to take questions or comments earlier.
I wanted first to cover some material." Clearly, the female critic at-
tributed the professor's behavior to his character or disposition, while he
attributed it to the situation."'
Attributing a person's action to his disposition could be a correct
assessment, but it could also be incorrect. It will almost certainly be
wrong from the actor's viewpoint, and the actor is not likely to be re-
sponsive to assessments, offers, or suggestions not salient to his own
perception of the situation. It is easy to imagine how differential observer
and actor perceptions of this kind could affect negotiators' judgments about
one another. If each negotiator, observing the other, attributes the other's
choices to disposition rather than to the situation, each may draw
conclusions, and make predictions, which may be incorrect. One might
think, for example, that because the other side was very resistant to one's
proposals, it was basically competitive. To counter, one might bargain
competitively as well. This could be mistaken, however, for it could be
that the other negotiator was simply responding to the way the proposals
were framed as he perceived them to bear on his interests.
[Persons] tend to simplify their decision task by ignoring the
contingent decision processes of competitive others. They as-
sume a particular future action by the opponent (e.g., based on
a most likely course of action or based on an expected value
81. We may even hold strongly to character beliefs in spite of contradictory evidence.
When evidence appears to disconfirm our beliefs, we carefully scrutinize the disconfirming
evidence rather than examine our beliefs. Usually, with intense scrutiny, we can find
problems with the disconfirming evidence and therefore reasons to discredit it. Often, people
confronted with evidence which conflicts with their beliefs come away holding their beliefs
more strongly than before. They either find the evidence to be too flawed to be credited or
less damaging than it originally appeared to be. See THoMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW
WHAT ISN'T So 64-67 (1991).
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assessment), rather than realizing that the opponent's behavior
is contingent on a variety of factors.'
Attributing behavior to disposition simplifies judgment, but leads to
misunderstandings that impede or distort judgment. To avoid such errors
of understanding, the negotiator must attempt to enter the other side's
"problem space,"' that is, to see the negotiation issues and situation as
the other side sees them. The negotiator, rather than offering his own
positions and rationales, needs to elicit talk, to get a good sense of the
other side's values, preferences, concerns and interests, the pressures it
feels, the aspirations it has, and so on.
C. Schemas, Scripts, and Setups
People generally interpret new situations in terms of schematic
conceptualizations, or schema, about what people are like, the ways events
play out, and how people act.s' A stereotype is a good example of a
schema as applied to persons. We know that when people use stereotypes
in characterizing others, they base their judgments about what others will
do on generalizations inherent in the stereotype rather than on an
individualized assessment. A "script" is a schema applied to events or
situations, and it is easiest to think of a script as a stereotyped sense of
how events or cause and effect sequences will play out.
When people communicate with one another, they of necessity in-
terpret or decode what the other says and does. But much communication
and behavior is ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. The
incident of the college professor described above is an example. People
also use schemas of various sorts to help interpret others and their
behavior.
1. Set-ups
While there are countless cognitive schemas, it is possible to
predispose people to use one particular schema of interpretation rather than
another by setting-up their expectations. Psychological studies have shown
that people given positive introductions to a speaker or lecturer
82. Bazerman & Neale, supra note 76, at 112.
83. Max H. Bazerman, et al., Groups as Mixed-Motive Negotiations, in LAWLER, E.J.,
& MARKOVSKY, B., EDS., ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES: THEORY AND RESEARCH, vol. 5
(1988).
84. See RICHARD NISBEr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 28 (1980).
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consistently rate her more positively than people given negative
introductions to the same speaker. Indeed,
[tihose expecting a 'warm' instructor perceived him to be rel-
atively sociable, informal, even-tempered, friendly, and so on,
and they responded accordingly.... In contrast, subjects
expecting a cold instructor rated the same person as relatively
self-centered, unsociable, and formal, and they showed a corre-
sponding reluctance to participate in the class.'
In other words, by manipulating a person's prior expectations, one can
dispose him to interpret another person's behavior or a situation favorably
or unfavorably, in line with the set-up.
It is even possible to predispose people to act in certain ways. In
an experiment involving persons playing the prisoner's dilemma game, the
players were exposed to human interest stories prior to undertaking play.
In one case, the story was a "heart-warming account of someone who
offered a kidney to someone whom he did not know who was in need of a
transplant. In another instance, subjects heard a ghastly account of an
urban atrocity." s' Those players who heard the heart-warming account
played the game much more cooperatively than those who listened to the
atrocity story.
The best explanation for what happened in these experiments is
that the manipulations caused the subjects to access certain interpretive
schemas which they then used to "read" ambiguous information or to cue
their own behavior. The application of these ideas in a negotiation context
is fairly obvious. A negotiator can "set-up" or predispose the other side
to bargain in certain ways by manipulating its prior expectations. For
example, when preparing to negotiate against someone anticipated to be a
soft-bargainer, the negotiator could insure that the other side receives the
message that his own side has little to give and that if there is to be a
bargain, the other side will have to be willing to concede. Similarly, if
one wants to promote cooperative or problem-solving bargaining, it would
be useful, prior to bargaining, to regale the other side with stories likely to
elicit a positive, cooperative, or problem-solving frame of mind.
85. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 37.
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2. Commitment and Escalation.'
Commitment to a goal and high aspiration secures persistence,
tenacity, and often success. There is good evidence that commitment and
high aspiration also contribute to negotiation success. The reasons are
obvious. They both lead to firmness, and as long as the other party is less
firm, to concessions from the other side. In problem-solving bargaining,
commitment to maximizing one's interest leads to an intense search for
ways to do just that.
But commitment can lead to failure too, or worse, even to esca-
lating and expensive conflict as parties raise stakes and invest more in
winning until winning becomes a single-minded prize apparently worth
almost any cost.
Decision-making in negotiation requires interpreting the moves
and actions of other parties. Commitment to an end, however, tends to
bias both a negotiator's interpretation of information and his judgment.
When one has staked oneself on, and made investments in, a commitment,
there is a tendency to justify oneself' s Rather than look at the situation
objectively, one interprets it in ways that favor one's preconceived view of
the situation. The poker player, having invested all of his chips in a hand,
borrows more to stay in, believing the other player, who continues to
raise, is just bluffing. When the defendant refuses to settle for a high fig-
ure, the trial lawyer remains confident that she can destroy the defendant's
case before the jury. A country, having lost many lives in a war, believes
the enemy is about to collapse, and that more troops and equipment -- just
a bit more fighting, will bring victory. "It's not possible to stop now, in
sight of victory when we have already sacrificed so much. Hang on just a
little more."
Continued investments in the face of large losses is just another
example of risk-taking to avoid a loss. What is important for present
purposes, however, is not so much that phenomenon, but the
rationalization process that accompanies it. Parties who have invested
heavily in commitments are likely to entrap themselves in escalating
conflict, even irrationally so, yet remain unaware of their lack of
objectivity. This is most likely where parties have not set limits on their
commitment; when they do not, or cannot, take time-outs to reassess their
investment; when they are not clearly aware of the costs they are
incurring; and where they must "save face," that is, justify their actions to
87. See generally PRIirr & RUBIN, supra note 13.
88. Id. at 121-122.
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themselves or to some constituency or other audience.'
Mere statement of these factors .contributing to escalation points to
obvious precautions that will help prevent spiraling conflict. Setting
investment limits beforehand clearly helps. Periodic "objective"
assessments of the investment in the conflict or negotiation are also useful.
In such assessments, it is important to focus on the current and prospective
set of costs and benefits rather than past expenditures. When parties focus
on additional losses they may incur, they are more likely to adopt courses
of action designed to prevent future loss. One evident course is simply to
accept those losses already suffered and not to invest more.
3. Sunk Costs
Suppose you have purchased a $100 ticket to a musical
production. On the evening you had planned to go and see it, you feel
tired and think, "Golly, I wish I hadn't bought that ticket. I'd much
rather stay home tonight than go to the theater." Should you go to the
theater or stay home? Would you stay home if you could get your $100
back? Should you treat your ticket purchase as an investment you do not
want to waste, or should you conclude that the money you paid for the
ticket is gone, whatever you do?
Money you have already paid out, or investments of any kind that
you have made, which you will lose no matter what you do are called
sunk costs." If you actually prefer to stay home rather than go to the
theater, but you go to the theater anyway, you are doing something that
you do not want to do in order to avoid a loss that you will experience in
any case. In effect, you invest more, or impose additional costs on
yourself, in order to feel that your prior expenditure has neither been in
vain, nor wasted. But, while it is rational to base a decision on future
consequences, it is irrational to base it on past events you cannot change.
It is irrational to act merely to honor sunk costs, that is, to let a past
investment govern a future choice simply in order to feel that you have
gotten something for your investment. In other words, sunk costs, of
themselves, do not provide a rational justification for incurring additional
costs or maintaining a course of action.
If there are reasons other than sunk costs for continuing a course
of action, then perhaps it is rational to do so. For example, if you have
made a commitment to someone else that you would go to the theater, in
not going, you break your commitment. Then you might become known
89. Id. at 124-125.
90. DAWNES, supra note 78, at 22.
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as someone who breaks commitments. In such a case, however, it is the
future consequence of reputational loss that might persuade you to go to
the theater, and your choice would be rational.
The irrational inclination to honor sunk costs may arise in ne-
gotiations in a variety of ways. One might, for example, be tempted to
conclude a deal, rather than look elsewhere, because of the time, effort,
and resources expended in the negotiation so far. But such costs are not
necessarily an appropriate focus of negotiation decision-making, which
instead should be the future consequences of the deal and the other
alternatives one has, including all associated costs.
In a similar way, a concern with sunk costs might incline a
negotiator to hard-bargain rather than problem-solve. If a party focuses on
losses as a reference point, he or she will take risks, including risks of
non-agreement, to avoid suffering the loss. If it were possible to persuade
the party to think of the loss as sunk costs, however, it would be easier to
focus on how a possible agreement would affect its interests in the future.
A company sues an architect for an alleged flawed building design that the
company has spent $500,000 to correct. The suit, which is not by any
means a sure winner, will cost the company $250,000 to pursue through
trial, including all attorney fees, discovery and expert witness costs, and
lost staff time. In negotiations with the architect and her insurer, should
the company hold out for $500,000 because that is how much it is out of
pocket? Clearly, the company should base its decision-making solely on
the probabilities of winning its suit. If they are good, it should perhaps
press for maximum recovery; if not, it should settle for what it can get,
notwithstanding the losses it will be unable to recoup.
In summary, rational decisions are based on an assessment of
future possibilities and probabilities. The past is relevant only insofar as
it provides information about possible and probable futures. Rational
decision-making demands the abandonment of sunk costs, unless such
abandonment creates problems outweighing the benefits of
abandonment.9"
D. Saving Face and Giving Face.
How one addresses the question of saving face is not so obvious.
Saving face is a matter of finding some interpretation of the situation,
including losses, which permits a party to feel, or credibly claim, that its
action or decision was justified, and that its action was not senseless, but
had meaning.
91. Id. at 31.
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To give an example, I once represented a group of migrant farm
workers who organized to protest and fight substandard living conditions at
a farm labor camp. Getting little positive response from the authorities
running the camp, the farm workers escalated their tactics progressively,
moving from demonstrations to refusals to pay rent. Eventually, they took
over the camp and refused to leave, even after the harvest season had
ended. The struggle had cost them much, and authorities were threatening
to enter the camp and evict the farm workers. In private meetings, the
workers said they would chain themselves and their wives and children to
beds and radiators to prevent their eviction. It was clear, however, that
the authorities would take over the camp, using police forces to arrest the
workers, and that they would prosecute them. Although the farm workers
knew they would lose this battle, they were willing to go to jail to affirm
the justice of their cause and to justify to themselves, and others, the
actions they had taken up to this final confrontation.
After a long meeting, we resolved the issue by persuading the
farm workers to declare a victory - they had been successful in bringing
their plight to public and official attention (even the Governor had sought
to intervene) - and to hold a farewell fiesta at the camp as a way of
celebrating and thanking supporters. This is what the farm workers did.
In retrospect, the negotiation or conflict resolution strategy behind
this solution is clear. The farm workers were involved in an escalating
conflict that was headed for a showdown they would lose. Even a loss
would give meaning to their protest, but declaring victory and holding a
fiesta also gave meaning to their prior actions as well as providing a
rationale for ending them. By allowing the farm workers to save face, it
spared them further costly confrontations quite unlikely to create any gain.
When caught in a spiraling conflict, a party wishing to cut its
losses and get out often needs to find an interpretation of its withdrawal
that justifies its whole course of conduct to that point rather than making it
appear senseless, foolish, cowardly, or weak. This is particularly true
where the party must explain itself to a constituency or some public.
There is simply a need to avoid or blunt belittling criticism.
Saving face is important in successfully concluding some conflicts
and negotiations. Indeed, it is so important that negotiators need not only
be sensitive to it, but also be willing to "give face." By giving face, I
mean helping the other party to make face-saving claims about the course
of the negotiations and the results achieved. This can be done by
constructing some agreed upon, dignifying, justifying, public description
of the parties' activities, and agreements or non-agreements.
Alternatively, a negotiator can give the other side something it can
publicly use to assert that it did not come away from the negotiation
defeated, empty-handed, nor in any way taken or humiliated.
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E. Cognitive Overload
As the number of parties, issues, and possible outcomes in a
negotiation increase, so too does its complexity. Every party may take a
different position on each issue, and each issue may have many possible
outcomes. If the parties make trade-offs between issues and different
possible outcomes on each issue, the complexity may seem unmanageable.
Take, for example, a six party negotiation over six issues with six possible
outcomes on each issue. The parties will have 36 possible outcomes to
bargain over, and as each may value the outcomes differently, there may
be as many as 216 trades to make. Actually, there may be more, as
parties experiment with different possible packages.
To the potential complexity of trades, we must add different
personalities, communication styles, bargaining expectations, and
strategies. If the negotiators at the table represent organizations or
constituencies, there will be additional bargaining problems as negotiators
either attempt to carry out bargaining instructions or provide information
to their principals so the latter can reassess their positions. Finally,
depending on the nature of the issues involved, parties at the table may
seek to form coalitions in order to secure an agreement. Forming such
coalitions comprises a sub-negotiation within the larger negotiation and
will affect it. Coalition members may strike sub-deals among themselves;
countercoalitions may form.
Every such change in a situation that is quite fluid and dynamic
affects the bargaining space and the configuration of bargaining positions
within it. As each new item appears in the bargaining -- a new piece of
information, a concession, a proposal, a change of position, an apparent
coalition -- parties may responsively reassess their positions and further
change the bargaining configuration. Multi-party, multi-issue bargaining
operates much as a kaleidoscope, where a small change, a slight twist of
the viewing cylinder, precipitates a complete reconfiguration of scene.
In such complex bargaining, the negotiating parties may have to
process and deal with more information than they can handle, a situation
of cognitive overload. It is in just such situations that people attempt to
simplify decision-making by resorting to various rules or guidelines. For
example, rather than deal with the complexity, a party may decide to
follow its predetermined course of action, in effect ignoring information
acquired in the bargaining. Another response might be quick compromise.
Rather than work through the complexity, the negotiator, feeling
overwhelmed, capitulates. In a sufficiently complex bargain, the
negotiators might conclude they are just going around and around, without
getting anywhere, and give up altogether. A party, not seeing any way
through the complexity favorable or acceptable to itself, might fear the
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other parties might strike a deal either freezing it out or disadvantageous to
it, and attempt to form a blocking coalition killing any deal.
Aside from patient, painstaking, hard work, there are three
general ways to handle cognitive overload in negotiation. The first is
simply awareness of the phenomenon, which can serve to inoculate a
negotiator from the frustrations of complexity and check the tendency to
seek easy solutions.
More importantly, negotiators involved in complex bargaining
must have a concern for the processes they are using to attempt to reach
agreement. Since they will be involved in a shifting dynamic of trade-
offs, they need some process which will help them fairly sort out their
relative preferences and priorities. In effect, the parties need to establish a
clearinghouse for information, a neutral market for making trades, and a
group problem-solving process 'to help them create additional value.
If the parties are trusting of one another, they can do this on their
own. If not, they will have difficulty, for they will not be sufficiently
disclosing information to make efficient trades. In such a situation, straw-
voting on proposed packages sometimes works because, without any party
disclosing too sensitive private information about where other parties
stand, all parties can get information about where it ultimately stands, at
least enough to allow reassessment of positions and repackaging. If the
parties follow this procedure iteratively, they can often construct final
packages acceptable to all.
Sometimes what occurs is that one party takes on a leadership or
facilitative role, framing and preparing packages and eliciting responsive
information which it then uses to reformulate proposals. Finally, parties
involved in complex bargaining should consider using a neutral facilitator
or mediator. A trusted, neutral party can sometimes create the
information clearinghouse, trading market, and inventive problem-solving
process the parties unaided cannot.
A final way to improve one's decision-making in complex ne-
gotiations, and to get better results, is intense preparation of the kind
discussed in Parts II and III of this article. Indeed, carrying out those
analyses and steps, with due attention to potential cognitive difficulties .in
negotiation, will greatly improve negotiation decision-making and results.
V. CONCLUSION
Negotiating in a problem-solving manner is the most productive
way to negotiate and to resolve disputes. While the problem-solving
model is a simple one, it is not necessarily simple to execute effectively.
Many negotiations and disputes may involve conflicting interests which the
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parties can reconcile only through trade-offs. Lacking an understanding of
how compromise and trade-offs work in problem-solving negotiation,
parties may bargain ineffectively, not maximizing their interests as well as
possible under the circumstances. Even if they know how these matters
work, they may yet bargain inefficiently if they have not clarified in
advance what they seek from the negotiation and what they are willing to
trade. The negotiator needs to identify all possible issues and outcomes,
not only from her own perspective, but, insofar as possible, from that of
other negotiating parties as well.
The negotiator should identify his own fundamental interests and
those of other parties. Examining the array of interests allows a negotiator
to anticipate the issues, and, in particular,' the issues having relevance for
other participants. Having identified possible issues, it is also possible to
identify a range of outcomes on each issue and to value them. Not all the
issues and possible outcomes a party identifies will have any immediate
value to it, but some may have value as tradable items. In other words,
the negotiator may identify outcomes that are of little or no concern to
itself, but of value to other parties. During the negotiation, the negotiator
can trade these items for items of value to him.
Finally, personality matters aside, a problem-solver working with
others needs to appreciate their contingent decision-processes. He should
attend to the cognitive frameworks that humans characteristically use to
simplify decision-making, for the problem may lie in the frame, not in the
framer.
